

THE
RELATIONS OF EDUCATION
TO CITIZENSHIP

BY
SIMEON E. BALDWIN



NEW HAVEN
YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
MDCCCXII

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First published, September, 1912
Second printing, March, 1918

TO MY SISTER
ELIZABETH WOOSTER WHITNEY
WHOSE LOVE HAS CHEERED MY LIFE
AND WHOSE SON
EDWARD BALDWIN WHITNEY
MADE HIS EDUCATION TELL IN
PUBLIC SERVICE
I DEDICATE THIS BOOK

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THE RELATIONS OF
EDUCATION TO CITIZENSHIP

I

THE POWER WHICH EDUCATION GIVES FOR PUBLIC SERVICE

AN ancient university becomes an assemblage of many foundations. They are the gifts and bequests of as many different men, each seeking to perpetuate the pursuit of some particular line of thought or knowledge, which seems to him of especial importance.

The founder of this annual lecture was one whose life was a long exposition of what a good citizen can do, though it may be mainly, or wholly, in private station, to make things better in a public way. His object in making this gift to Yale was, to use his own words, to promote among "students and graduates, and among educated men of the United States, an understanding of the duties of Christian citizenship, and a sense of personal responsibility for the performance of those duties."

I shall, then, address myself particularly to those who are receiving, or have received, such a training as makes educated men.

They constitute, throughout the world, a fast-growing class, to whom there has been offered great opportunities; on whom there has been thrown corresponding obligations. Not since the early middle ages have universities been so thronged. During the first decade of this century, the attendance at those in Germany increased from 34,000 to 55,000;¹ and that at those of our own country in a proportion probably not less. This is due partly to the presence of more women,² but mainly to the common conviction of civilized mankind that a superior education is the best means of adjusting the individual suited to receive it to his environment and making him most useful in his place as a member of human society.

It involves instruction in the literature of knowledge, and the literature of power; in what belongs to the intellect, and in what belongs to the heart; in the spiritual possessions, as well as the material possessions of our race. So far as it is gained in

¹ In the Winter semester of 1911-12, 57,398 students were matriculated in the twenty-one German universities, besides 5,563 "auditors," who attended lectures, but were not matriculated.

² Among the students described in the foregoing note there were 2,796 women in the lists of those matriculated, and 1,739 more of them in the lists of auditors. Science, xxxv, N. S. 648.

college or university, it is for each accompanied by a judgment of his character, rendered by instructors and fellow-students, frankly pronounced, unsparing in its tone whether of commendation or condemnation, and for the most part self-convincing to himself.

Education, if it be real, is one of the great gifts of life.

Every man, Goethe said, is either an anvil or a hammer. The educated man has passed through the stage of the anvil and, if he is worth anything in character, is a hammer. Those of them who are worth the most to the community have been hammers from boyhood and, one might say, from birth.

The college student and the college graduate may and may not be educated men. College may add little or nothing to what they knew before. They may have allowed themselves to forget that, and to make no new acquirements that are real and substantial. Dean Swift said of Oxford, in his bitter way, that it was a seat of great learning. Everybody who entered it brought some learning with him, for unless he did, he could not gain admission. No one, when he left the University, ever took any learning away. Therefore it steadily accumulated there. I do not think that the limits

of irony would permit such a taunt to be fairly flung at Yale, or indeed at any university of our day, in England or America.

Without denying that success in athletics is ranked too high in the student-world, as compared with success in scholarship, we must remember that distinction is dear to all, and that Nature produces more young men with capabilities for eminence in the contests of the ball field and the rowing course, than of those who can win the highest scholastic honors. We must remember, too, that the athlete is the product of careful and special education in certain lines, — the education of the body and of the habit of mind. He has learned to be attentive, observant, accurate, obedient. He knows his place. Athletic "training" is another name for self renunciation and self restraint. If it leads to the coveted success, the man, we may be sure, has done good work in his own peculiar sphere; and whoever in the world does that deserves applause. He has shown both strength of body and strength of character; and he is admired for both.

Still, athletics is but one of the side-shows in College life, and the men know it.

It was reassuring to hear, last year, of a result of an inquiry set on foot by one of the staff of the

Yale News. The members of the two lower classes in Yale College were asked which would be their preference: to win a Y in athletics, or the rank in scholarship that assured membership in the Φ B K Society. A large majority preferred eminence in scholarship to eminence in athletics. They were ready to take education in arts and letters at its real value. They felt that to gain that was what had brought them here.

. But College, at best, can give us but a small part of an education. It is only the preface of the book, which she translates for us. Her aim is to let us know why it was written, and for what. What it is comes later. In Emerson's words: "The things taught in colleges and schools are not an education, but the means of education." The world is our best, as it is our earliest, teacher, — a hard mistress, but generally a just one. She gives and takes.

We can be taught to understand what she shows us, better than the wholly uneducated man can. We can be taught to cultivate our powers of observation and discrimination, so that we can perceive what she shows us, more clearly than he. We can be taught to reason; to compare; to study the relations of things; to look for the rule that measures

great things, as well as small; to use the glass that makes small things seem great, and explain the great.

Juvenal said that a single house would show whatever is done or suffered in the world. Education may give us the power to see, — to see really, — that which it contains.

It may give us the X ray power to see into others' hearts. It is true that the experiences of our own life, as it goes on from year to year, are to teach us the deepest lessons. The student of psychology particularly finds his best master here. But he learns also to respect the self-knowledge of those who have had experiences which are not likely to come to him. Except so far, for instance, as the penologist can penetrate the mind of the criminal classes, he will know less of the motives or the consequences of crime than the convict in his cell. Sin reveals the sinner to himself.

Education will help to give us another quality which, in considering any duties attaching to citizenship, is of the first importance. I mean a steady balance of judgment.

The man whom, in the long run, the people are most ready to trust with the care of great things is not the enthusiast, because of his enthusiasm;

not the orator, because of his eloquence; but the well-poised, cool, and careful statesman.

There is a word in our language which has acquired a new meaning of late years. It is "sanity." We use it to express a faculty of coming to calm and sober decisions, — of taking calm and sober views, belonging in a marked degree to an exceptional man. He is "sane." The rest of us are not. This way of looking at men's minds indicates the feverishness of our age. It is unsettled. We may reasonably look to men of higher education to cool it off; to quiet and steady it; to give its forces a direction in healthy ways.

Education tends to tolerance. It opens our eyes to the element of soundness and vitality which is to be found in most things that, as a whole, are false and bad. It teaches us to meet what seems to us sophistry, at its first approach at least, with a certain respect. Our powers have been trained to enable us to disprove, not to deny. Denials, with no attempt at disproof, simply irritate. Lessing once said that the only people who bear contradiction patiently are the dead; and Voltaire, approaching the same thought from the other side, declared that it was the triumph of reason to be able to live comfortably with those who haven't

got it. Possibly we may find in the end, that it was we, who were without it. And the end is the point of view which an educated man never forgets. He knows that time is the great teacher.

Education is always a slow process. The facts which it builds on and the relations between them were each, at some time, newly discovered, and at first but half accepted. Origen said that God had sown truth in the world, but had let mankind arrive at it by the slow instrumentality of human research. Education has opened the mind to receive it; but has also given us the defence of distrust. Is it something real that has been brought to light; or has merely a new name been given to an unreality? There is a good deal in that observation in *Wilhelm Meister*, that books generally do little more than give our errors names.

In distinguishing error from truth, the educated man finds more difficulty in choosing his course than the uneducated man, and much more than the half-educated man. Breadth of view is the great gift of education. This unsettles as well as settles the mind. It keeps it in a habit of comparison.

A college does for us what travel does. It changes our horizon every day. It does also what travel cannot do: It shows us the horizon which limited

the view of the greatest men in every preceding age.

Astronomers tell us that the earth in her course about the sun is continually coming nearer and nearer to it; that her orbit narrows as the cycles of time pass by. It is not so with the free mind of man. If the current of human thought, as the centuries run on, tends to return upon itself; if lost arts are rediscovered; if the atomic theory of Lucretius is reproduced by modern chemistry; if the evolution of things of which Goethe spoke as a poet, be again proclaimed by Darwin as a naturalist; the educated man sees that the old subject is taken up with a new power. It is carried farther. The sweep of the mind is ever centrifugal. Measure its range by such periods as befit the problem, and it never narrows. Were there dark ages? Yes. But how small a place belongs to them in the two hundred thousand years during which man may have inhabited this planet! In the grand words of St. Peter, "one day is with the Lord as a thousand years and a thousand years as one day." We are probably still in the beginning of human history. We are learning still the elements of knowledge. But the discovery of each has been part of a continuous process. It takes, as it comes, its appointed

place in the kingdom of human thought, whose history links us to the divine, and has no reference to time:—no reference, except that at any moment when an expression of that thought by one man is to be judged by another, the judgment will be false unless that whole history be taken into view.

We get in college a start towards the highest things of knowledge. If we make the most of it, they will become ours. But an acquaintance with the highest things of knowledge is not necessary for the educated man. He is educated, who can raise himself above the common level of the community by making common things his own, in the fullest sense. It is not his dead self that he stands upon, but his living self. He has received, and he has assimilated.

There are who receive; and give out nothing.

Education, in imparting power, involves, as has been said, corresponding responsibility. The educated American has received the same citizenship as the uneducated American, but he has, in taking it, accepted a far heavier weight of duty. He must hammer the anvil. He must be an intellectual guide. He ought to be a moral guide. He may, highest of all, be a spiritual guide. He will be, in the truest sense, so far as he throws his spirit into those around

him, — his spirit of earnestness and sincerity; of ardor and enthusiasm; of devotion to a cause, and to the leader of a cause.

It is in these directions that the best education spends itself, and justifies itself. It is so at every stage, — with primary education as truly as with secondary education. As Emerson says: Each man is nothing else than a capacity for justice, truth, love, freedom, and power.¹ It is the supreme office of education to ascertain how best for each man to strengthen and elevate that one capacity; to feed it with what it is able to receive; to give it, as it grows, free course and glory. This it may do for each of us. The dullest needs it most and profits by it most.

But education cannot re-create the man. We are not all born equal. The value of a man, like the value of a mill-stream, depends upon the head. No training can give either of the qualities which, as Lecky says, lead to the most splendid successes of life: — tact and judgment, by which one is enabled to seize opportunities and make the most of them.

The best that college can do in those lines is to strengthen the judgment, where it is feeble, by

¹ Journals, 127.

enlarging the horizon of view, and to lead to what may appear to be tact, but is only the observance of wise social conventions.

Every young man, whatever may be his native gifts, suffers from the want of sufficient standards of comparison. In critical moments, he does not know what others have done when such moments came to them. He does not know what are critical moments, for he cannot measure cause and effect in the full light of history or of philosophy. Increasing years will help him, here, and education, more.

But he who has had the advantage of superior training in addition to tact and judgment, born in him, is a trustee of great possessions. He has inherited great things and he has also that which makes them of the highest worth. He is one of those answerable for ten talents, because ten have been committed to him. He must not shirk the public duties, which they impose.

Neither can he look otherwise than with admiration on the men whom he may meet in public life who have educated themselves. The Franklins and Shermans, whose reading was at odd hours, and self-directed, became entitled to the name of educated men in the fullest sense. They had missed

much, but they could afford to miss much, because they had acquired much.

Their birthright of power was also, in some points, a title to public favor and confidence. The self-educated man often has more influence over the general public than those who have received a collegiate education. He was born with superior talents. He has added cultivation. He stands head and shoulders above the crowd, and yet he was born one of them and bred one of them. They feel that he is their natural master. One who, with equal talents, has been educated by others wins such a position with far greater difficulty. He can win it, however, and it will be his own fault if he do not; probably a fault of manners.

One obstacle which, in a country like ours, lies before him to be conquered, is a tendency among many who have had no collegiate education to look on those who have, as mere theorists.

The educated man is always a theorist, though he may dislike to be called so. But what is a theorist? As applied to questions of government it may mean the man who has the widest horizon, who knows the most of the historical experience of nations, who judges not by what has been the success, real or apparent, in his own time, or his own

land, of certain measures, but by what have been their effects in all times and all lands. Such an one is familiar with underlying principles.

Goethe said of Seneca that he saw Nature as an uncultivated man; since not it, but its events, interested him. The scientific theorist looks beneath the surface. He looks back, as well as forward.

The most popular cry, not only to-day, but always and everywhere in American politics, is for progressive policies. Our people have no patience with mere stand-stills. They know that all life is motion, and that that of society always ought to be and can be motion forward.

But it is often not an easy thing to distinguish between advancing and retrograding forces. Who can best do it? The man who has had scientific instruction in those general ideas which are common to all scholars of all countries and, we may almost say, of all times. He has read the books which the world has sifted out as worth saving from the libraries of three thousand years. He has been shown what experiments men have made in political government, and with what success. He has been taught something of what we call philosophy, — the science that concerns itself with the reason and principles of things and men.

He has learned to read history in that spirit. To the average man the history of his own country is valuable for itself. The main events which it records, and a few great facts of universal history, he ought to know, even if he cannot discern their relations and dependencies. But to the historical scholar, who can study them philosophically, they assume a meaning which enables him to be a true teacher of the people.

He will "speak forth the words of truth and soberness." No scholar is a ranter. The power of education is a steady rather than an impetuous force. It is unfavorable to enthusiasm. It does not carry points by storm. It may appeal to feeling, but it is because it sees a reason for so doing, rather than as a natural outburst of one who cannot do otherwise. Education does not make extremists. It compels consideration of both sides of a question, before adopting a definite position in regard to it.

As a result, the educated man will be apt to be neither a conservative nor a radical. He knows too much to be wholly satisfied with either policy. He knows that whatever in human politics is new is simply a re-adjustment of what is old, or a not unnatural development from it. He knows, too, that whatever in human politics is old is also dead,

unless susceptible of re-adjustment to what is new, or capable of developing itself from within into something new, with the help of new environment.

The noisy praters about new truths and new political discoveries, are generally those who, if they have tasted the Pierian spring at all, have not drunk deep at it. If they knew more of the past, they would know more of the present. They would be less eager to add incongruous appendages to ancient institutions, and more mindful that the incongruity between the less and the greater is always eventually fatal to the less.

In this lies one great and peculiar opportunity of the educated American in the twentieth century. It comes with the rapid increase of immigration from Continental Europe. Our people are daily recruited from those bred up under very different political institutions. The new comers know little of ours except that they assure large individual liberty, and also permit the free association of any who aim at social or economical change. A large part of them are distinctly socialists in the extremest sense. Ordinarily the foreigner who settles here believes that this is a land of opportunity, but does not know how it became such or is maintained such. He does not know how much he owes to our law.

He knows very well what impediments it put in the way of his entering the country. He is not predisposed to look on it with favor.

Goldwin Smith, in speaking of the Neapolitans, said that "when the law has been for centuries the enemy of the people, the people become the enemies of the law." Of those who now come to us in such great numbers from Southern Italy and Russia and Northeastern Europe, many have grown up with this inborn and hereditary feeling of enmity to law. They do not ask government to redress their wrongs. They prefer to do it themselves. They are apt to prefer a resort to pistols and knives, to bringing a law-suit or filing a complaint with a prosecuting officer. It is this way of looking at our legal institutions that leads so often to their abuse of the right of organized labor to strike, by resort to mob violence and arms to aid it.

They and their children must be taught the value of what they find here, and what it cost those from whom it has been inherited.

Education teaches how to reach such men and also how to influence public sentiment in respect to them. As to this, everyone who has been taught their language has a special responsibility, but all who have studied the history of their country, or

of the world, are in a position to do them, and through them the community, substantial service.

We wish for the perpetuity of American institutions. If it comes, it will not be from the persistence of the original stock of the first settlers. It will be from the persistence of their ideas of government and law.

The American race, except in the Southern States, is rapidly becoming a composite one. But in American institutions there has been shown a great assimilative power. Especially is this true of our system of popular education. It is given by educated people. It offers, at least, the beginnings of knowledge. The common school burns away the dross of alienage, and fuses gold with gold. The school teacher is the truest friend of constitutional government in the United States. He was, in the Southern States, before the civil war, the most dangerous man, as respects their system of social organization. He has been regarded with similar apprehension in Russia. There until recently no peasant could lawfully be taught by any one in more than a certain and closely limited number of specified subjects. A violation of this rule was a penal offence. A despotic empire, in other words, did not dare to let the common people acquire more than

the rudiments of knowledge. To teach them more might render them less compliant subjects.

The South remains of the old American type, because the foreigner seldom seeks a home there; and he seldom seeks it, because of the inferiority of its schools and the practical monopoly, out of the large cities and manufacturing centers, of negro labor.

There is less immigration also in the Western than in the Eastern States. The immigrants come across the Atlantic and prefer to settle near one of our great ports on that ocean, so that they can easily return to their native land.

It is, therefore, to the East that the growth of a foreign population here is especially important, and brings peculiar opportunities to public men.

The power of appreciating and grasping opportunities, whether in this or any other direction, is greatly strengthened by a superior education. It gives something to measure by. The people know this, though it is true that to fasten upon a public man the name of a scholar in politics is still to discredit him. If he be a scholar and nothing else, the world is quite right, should it put him aside for what it calls a practical statesman. One thus characterized may be a scholar too, though making less

parade of his scholarship. But it is more likely that, well as he may work in a narrow field, he is incapable of enlarging it. He will generally be familiar, at most, only with local and recent history, — with the articles of political science of the day, not with the reasons and conditions out of which they have been formulated.

If one of the school of "practical statesmen" rises to high office, it will generally be found that his advancement has come largely from his combining good judgment with great powers of literary composition. He comes to sound conclusions, and can tell why. He can tell why so plainly that everybody can follow his lines of thought, and comprehend exactly what the positions which he maintains are, and to what they lead.

Some men seem born with the gift of expressing themselves clearly and to the point. To every one, education gives a certain facility in this regard. It is a strong weapon, in strong hands.

The power of the pen in influencing political action is nowhere greater than with us, because, in view particularly of our law of libel, nowhere else is public discussion equally free.

Under the common law of England, the criticism of public men is much more restrained. Here the

candidate for public office by popular election, though it be a judicial one, must expect personal attacks and be able to repel them with vigor.

Here also the platform is assuming new importance from the spread of the initiative, referendum, and recall. Where a people legislates as a whole, without the benefit of such discussions as belong to representative legislatures, they must have brought before them the reasons for or against the measures, upon which they are to vote, in the clearest way, or the whole proceeding will be a mockery of justice.

So in every State a printed appeal, signed by influential men, to the electors, to vote for leaders who are committed to certain policies, will have great weight, and he who can put such a paper in the best form will do good service to his party and indeed to the community; for it will stir discussion on a high level and call for answer.

Such an appeal must be well-written, in order to catch the public eye: clear, concise, vigorous, earnest. It must be signed by men who command public confidence. Their names must be judiciously arranged. It must appear at the psychological moment, when it will be likely to prove most effective. It must be published in such form and way

as most surely to reach those whose votes it is designed especially to influence. A well-trained mind, and a well-trained mind only, can meet all these requirements.

We are considering the responsibilities and opportunities of Christian citizenship and how education helps to meet them. Sir Edward Burne-Jones said that the rule of Christianity was to make the most of your best, for the sake of others. No one can understand clearly how to do this, without the aid of education. That, in showing us the relations of things, points the way towards shaping our relations to others so as to make them of the fullest mutual benefit. What we have to say to them, it helps us to say clearly. What we have to do for them, it helps us to do effectively. What we have to fulfil of public duty, it helps us fulfil in a way to secure a public benefit.

The man, for instance, who reads French has an opportunity at hand every day to use his knowledge by studying at first hand the original records of the development of modern life in France. He does not have to wait until somebody else has selected which of the new books by French authors is most likely to sell in America, and then makes a translation of it, — very probably an inaccurate one. He makes

his own selections, and his own translation, on the instant, and if he is really familiar with the language, catches without fail the true meaning of the author.

Our government, at one time, fell into a serious misunderstanding with that of France, because in a despatch from Paris, in which the word *demande* was used, it was translated by the clerks in our State department as meaning not request, but demand.

The man who has been taught to read German has a still wider opportunity, because it is a language less known to Americans than the French; and the student of Italian, or Spanish, or Dutch, an opportunity in that respect yet more great.

Every foreign nation can teach us something in the field of politics, — something to follow, or something to avoid. Nor is an acquaintance so gained with the institutions of foreign lands, ever without a certain enlarging power over the mind of him who acquires it. His theories are broadened, if not corrected. He can measure better the limits of his own knowledge, and see better where he needs most to extend them. He rises towards the level of a citizen of the world.

In these days both of altruistic tendency and of increasing intercourse between nations, such train-

ing as universities can give strengthens capabilities for statesmanship as never before.

Prince Bismarck once said that a third of the students of German universities broke down from dissipation, and a third from overwork; but that the other third ruled Germany.

As one looks over the lists of the Presidents of the United States, the Cabinet officers, the rolls of Congress and the rosters of our State government, he is soon satisfied that the graduates of our American colleges and universities rule America, and that it takes more than a third of them to do it.

In other lands there are ruling classes, by law, or custom, or social causes lying deeper down. Here the only ruling class is that of educated men. They rule by their merits. The people know that out of them those to fill high places must generally be selected, and know, also, that there is a solid reason for it.

The educated man begins his active life in the world as a capitalist, and a capitalist that can never be bankrupt. Capital, existing in any honest form, brings respect. It also brings responsibility. The capitalist is bound to use his capital.

Every man, to be sure, is under a similar responsi-

bility in kind. Every man's powers, native or acquired, are his capital and part of the capital of the whole community. But to most men this capital is negligible in quantity, as compared with that which a liberal education gives. The possessor of that, above all others, is under bonds to serve the public to the measure of his opportunity, and to put his whole strength into whatever he may undertake. If he withholds any part of it, he wastes what is a substantial part of the capital of the world.

If he withholds none, he will not be without his reward. The sweetest thing in life, outside of the gifts of home, is to have power and to feel that you are exercising it well.

Burke said that political society was a partnership of the living and the dead. The living are mainly engaged in administering an established business. It is established on the contributions of the silent partner, — a partner eternally silent, — the dead. The active partners will succeed or fail according as they hold to what is good in the establishment, as they received it, and get rid of what is outworn and antiquated. They must be able to distinguish between the profitable and the unprofitable. They must know how to make up the cost-sheets.

Only the educated man can render to the public the best service in these respects. Only he who knows the causes of things can speak without fear and without favor.

*"Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
Atque metus omnes et inexorabile fatum
Subiacit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari."*

II

SHAPING EDUCATION TO CITIZENSHIP

DR. THOMAS ARNOLD, in one of his essays,¹ written in view of the passage of the Parliamentary Reform bill of 1832, discusses with his accustomed force the shaping of education to citizenship. Every man, he said, from the highest to the lowest, has two businesses. One is his own particular calling, to which he looks for a livelihood. The other is his general calling, which he has in common with the rest of the people, namely, the calling of a citizen and a man.

Everybody admits that he must receive a special education for his special calling. Why is it not equally necessary that he should receive one for his general calling? It is not generally deemed equally necessary, because the consequences of not receiving it are less obvious and direct. A tailor who has not been taught to make a coat decently will get few coats to make. He is written down a failure, from the start. But a man may be very poorly

¹ Miscellaneous Works, *The Education of the Middle Classes*, 375.

fitted for the duties of a citizen, and yet perform them after a fashion, in such wise that nobody will think much the worse of him for his deficiencies, and few will perceive them at all.

On the other hand, a good education for citizenship is more important to a country, such as ours, where the choice of rulers is in the hands of the people than a good education of certain of its people for certain particular callings. It can flourish without good artificers. It can buy mechanical productions from foreigners. But it cannot flourish unless it is fairly well ruled, and it cannot be ruled fairly well save by those who are chosen for their offices with some kind of discrimination, and guided in their administration by a sound public opinion. Citizenship in a republic, by its very nature, carries with it a peculiar duty and power.

The education of a king is planned with the main purpose of fitting him to govern well. It is too much to ask that the education of every citizen of a republic shall be planned with the main purpose of fitting him to govern well; but it is sadly defective if it is not planned with some reference to just that thing. He is a sharer in the power of sovereignty. His vote is as powerful as any other man's. His education has been, so far forth, a failure, if it has

not taught him the principles on which he should exercise this sovereign will, and the directions in which it should be exerted. While only one of many kings, he must be brought to feel that, in a sense, his fellow citizens are his people.

Each of us also is a citizen of the world, and each educated man, of necessity, contributes to the formation of that public opinion which is coming so largely to regulate the character of international relations.

The old-fashioned college education, before the system of elective studies received any great extension, was distinctly a training for the general calling of a man and a citizen. With the universal contraction of that system during the last few years, it is regaining the same character. But no inconsiderable part of the political vagaries of the past forty years may be traced to a one-sided education in special topics of political economy, sociology, or governmental administration.

The college graduate of a hundred years ago, and of fifty years ago, had been compelled to scatter his attack upon the citadel of learning, rather than to concentrate it. He scrutinized its walls from all sides. He was taught to take rapid and large views of large subjects; to get general impressions; to have a little knowledge of many things.

The college graduate of the last generation chose what studies he liked best, or thought would serve him best. In those he may have acquired great proficiency;—in those and perhaps in nothing else. I have heard of a doctor of philosophy, who not many years ago was graduated from one of our leading universities, after presenting a thesis considered of great merit, on some minute subject of investigation. In a casual conversation with him, soon afterwards, he was asked his opinion of the line of thought in *In Memoriam*. He had, it was found, never read the poem, nor ever heard of it.

Such specialization brings danger to the State. The men who have been its subjects have looked so long on narrow lines that they can only see straight in front of them. They must get breadth of vision before the people can take them as safe counselors. Our educators have now found this out. They have changed their methods. They have come to group elective studies, in such a way as to substitute their own judgment to a large degree for that of the Freshman or Sophomore.

If the student is allowed to specialize in the field of politics and constitutional government at too early a stage in his college career, he starts on his life voyage with an ill-loaded ship. It is out of

balance. He exaggerates the importance of the particular branch, to which he has dedicated his main efforts. This may be pardoned in one who is taking a graduate course. It may almost be encouraged, for only a certain enthusiasm and devotion, bred of deep conviction that his work is important to others than himself, will make a thesis, written as the condition of a doctorate in any faculty, quite worth its cost. But the Freshman occupies no such position. He is recording no self-achievement. He has discovered no new theory. He has found no new point of view. He has rescued no half-lost scrap of the learning of antiquity.

The first two years of a college course, it seems to me, should be largely given to enforced study in those fields of general information in which all educated men ought to feel somewhat at home. They will be precisely those fields which tend to produce good stuff for public service. Probably some of these studies will be distasteful to many. The pursuit of none will be thoroughly agreeable to all. But the mental discipline which comes from studying what one does not like, — what one finds hard and repulsive, — is of the highest value. James Martineau, in his old age, remarked that the college study which had done him the greatest good was

the higher mathematics, and that he chose it because he hated it.

Every student is not a Martineau. The temptation is strong, wherever choice is free, to take the easiest work. The re-action from the elective system of the latter part of the nineteenth century has already proved itself justified by its results. Its best characteristic is that, on the one hand, it has not been too violent and, on the other, that it has not been limited by any blind adhesion to standards of antiquity. They are not to be looked at as inviolable, though one must feel his way, and move slowly, in planning any changes in methods of university instruction. He must take short views, and pay constant regard to present conditions, not forgetting that one retains only that which he can assimilate.

As times change, colleges must, to some extent, change with them. The relative values of different studies will inevitably vary. No age can justly assume the right to prescribe what shall be the subjects of public instruction in the next. The end and objects of education can be approached through widely different curriculums.

It was not until the sixteenth century¹ that

¹ In 1502, at Wittenberg.

Latin, Greek, and Hebrew were taught in any European university and, one after the other, ever since the beginning of the eighteenth, they have been giving place, as studies necessary to a proper training for life, to others belonging more closely to the modern world. Among these, such as pertain to the organization of human society, have steadily grown in favor. With every extension of the right of political self-government comes a new call for instruction in the art of self-government, — a call never so imperative as since the widely-spreading use of the direct primary, the initiative, the referendum, and the recall. The university exists largely for social culture, and "social culture is the training of the individual for social institutions."

All institutions have a political bearing. Their influences for the good of the people will be constantly challenged by some. They often become the subject of party discussion, and this in turn, will call for the consideration of the class-room in the university.

The teaching on public questions ought to be positive. The student ought to know on what side his instructor is ranked. Then he can guard himself the better, from being carried away, and weigh the doctrines set before him with more precision. Of course, the instructor will refer to the main

authorities, leading to opposite conclusions. But he will lose in power, if he does not dogmatically assert his own belief and urge it as the true one.

Certain things have been reasoned out by former generations to the end. They are settled. The process of attainment is now of slight importance, in view of the result. Certainty has been reached. The early years of College must be largely given to imparting these certainties. The student's time is too valuable to allow us to encourage him to work out the problems anew. A solid stepping stone has been created. It is for him to use it as such, without first stopping to ask where it was brought from, or how it became so firmly imbedded in the soil. He is being trained to use facts. He must first know facts; and the facts are, in the beginning of a liberal education, more important than the process by which they were ascertained.

In Rousseau's *Émile*, he is insistent on the prime necessity of laying down rules of conduct for children, without giving them a reason for any of them. Let them learn the rule and the unpleasant consequences of breaking it, first. Explanations of grounds, on which it has been adopted, may better be left to future years. He would have had little patience with a modern school of pedagogy which

would spend itself in teaching the child to reason out for itself the propriety of each step, the merits of each rule. There is a story, which ought to be true if it is not, of a little girl so trained, who was asked how much seven times six made. "O, dear," was the reply, "I worked over that a week, last Winter. I made up my mind it must be either 40 or 42. I've forgotten which, now, and I don't care, for our class has got through multiplication."

I believe in teaching the ordinary child the multiplication table, before teaching him the reasons for the statements which it makes. I believe in teaching the student of language, in school and college, to learn by heart the conjugations and declensions as so many ultimate facts, and let comparative philology come later, if it come at all. I believe that there are facts dominating the treatment of questions of public right and individual duty to the State, which in school, and in early College days should be stated and dwelt on as finalities, with more reference to what they are, than to how or when men found them out.

The work of the first two years of College, in the direction of civics, has for its legitimate end, not to make great statesmen, but to make good citizens. This is necessarily fostered, in some degree, by college

life. Submission to a collegiate discipline prescribed by a superior authority is an excellent preparation for that submission to a broader discipline which characterizes life under a system of liberty regulated by law. Obedience to authority is taught best, no doubt, in military institutions. It is the redeeming feature of the great military establishments of Continental Europe. But it may be learned sufficiently by every college student to seem to him a natural guide in the future discharge of civic duty. .

Respect for those in authority, and for the law whose ministers they are, cannot be taught too fully to the young. Civics as a subject of study, may be, and often is. In giving instruction in that, there is a constant temptation to go too far. The field is familiar to the instructor by force of what he has picked up from his own experience and observation. There are probably some things in it which have struck him as of particular importance. He naturally wishes to explain these to his pupils. It is a pleasure to him to do this. Every teacher, who is worthy of his calling, enjoys sharing with his more advanced classes whatever is connected with the topic under consideration which, at the time, especially interests him. He is thus in danger of hurrying them on beyond their strength, and of giving them more

than they can profitably receive. There is a rule of "accommodation" under which every true teacher works, whether he has ever heard of such a rule, or not. It is what forces him to present the subject which he has in hand so that it can be apprehended and accepted by those who know less about it than he, and who would certainly fail to comprehend it in its true meaning and relations if he gave it to them in all its fulness, as it appeared to him.

But there are principles of our political system which a child can fully master, and historical facts underlying it, which he can be made to remember and to reason from.

The public schools cannot begin too early to call the attention of the children to some of the political characteristics of the land they live in. It is easy to teach them that there are no kings on the American continent. It is easy to teach them to respect the flag of the United States. The youngest in the school room can join in singing "America," and he will soon want to know who the pilgrims were.

By the time the child is twelve or thirteen he can appreciate a good deal that distinguishes his country from others in its institutional aspect. He can appreciate more, of its simpler characteristics,

than is generally told him by his teachers. In fact, the weak point in our American system of education seems to me to be in giving, in the earlier school years, too little information about necessary things, and perhaps, in the later school years, too much information about unnecessary things.

By the time that the preparatory school is reached, civics can be taught scientifically, but never fully. Scientific methods require that the classes, even in the highest forms, should be made to understand that any such instruction can, at best, be only elementary and partial. A serious danger lies in the very excellence of our system of public education. It may lead those trained under it to think their knowledge greater than it is. What they have too often learned is, in the words of Mr. Bryce, "sufficient to enable them to think they know something about the great problems of politics, and insufficient to show them how little they know." But no boy of sixteen need leave the academy or high school without some clear notions of what free government means; of the outline history of his own State; and of the fact that, as fully as the United States are sovereign within their sphere, is each State sovereign within its sphere.

From twelve to twenty, no year of a boy's life,

while under instruction in school or college, ought to pass, without some distinct endeavor on the part of his instructors to prepare him for the public duties, which he is soon to take upon himself. Where children are of foreign parentage this is doubly true; but every American also, born of native stock, ought to be taught and re-taught something of the strong and of the weak points of our political system, and how the weak, though they exist, are over balanced by the strong.

Let them be led to admire their country, and look up with reverence and affection to her great men of former generations. Hero-worship is a natural tendency in student years. It gives history its light and patriotism its inspiration. Americans are fortunate in having had men like Washington and Jefferson; Nathan Hale and Abraham Lincoln. To every school-boy they ought to be familiar characters. In admiring the great men of his country's history, he enters a path that naturally leads to admiration of the form of government which so many of them helped to frame or to develop. Let him be helped to see what its essential and characteristic features are.

There are certain absolute notions of the nature of law which serve as a basis for the institutions of

every nation. No man's life in that nation can be well-ordered, if he does not know what those notions are, and does not look to them (even if desirous to replace them by something better) in a sympathetic spirit. The education which does not make clear what are the fundamental characteristics of the form of civil government under which those who are the subjects of that education are to enter on the duties of citizenship, is radically defective.

No foreigner can become one of us unless he convinces the court of naturalization that he is attached to "the principles" of the Constitution of the United States. He must know what they are, before he can feel such an attachment. Much more must the native citizen have that knowledge. It requires no long courses in Constitutional law or American history. A hundred words will tell the story.

It is enough if the student is made to understand that American institutions rest upon individual responsibility, without respect of persons; obedience to law; religious liberty; free schools; security to person and property from all unjust attack; no privileged orders; such equality of opportunity as laws can properly assure; home rule through the several States in most things; a strong national

government as to a few things; short written Constitutions, republican in form, distinguishing these things in outline; a power in the judiciary to distinguish them in detail; a general, but not rigid, division of the powers of government, whether State or national, between three departments, executive, judicial, and legislative, the latter to be commonly administered by a legislative assembly; and an indestructible union of indestructible States. Something like this may be his "shorter catechism." I speak of course only of what it is necessary to learn in order to comprehend the ground-work of American government.

But there is a ground below every ground-work. The ground of hope for the permanence and vitality of our political institutions is the honest purpose, the manly character, and law-abiding habit of mind of the American people.

There is a sentimental quality that attaches to the best methods of instruction. No education gives a proper preparation for citizenship which does not strike the inner chords of the student's nature. The heart directs the mind. At least it chooses for the mind. It acts more quickly.

The moral feelings of a people are their main safeguard. The moral quality of their leaders is

more important than their mental power. A good character, no doubt, is largely the subject of inheritance and early environment. School, to an American, forms a large part of that environment. If it is made to teach, and if our Colleges are made to teach, directly or indirectly, the good of reverence, of honor, of loyalty, of truth, of social courtesy, the foundations of civic duty will be well laid.

Too much care cannot be taken in selecting teachers, at every stage of education, to pick out those, so far as possible (and it is possible oftener than is sometimes thought), whom their students can admire for deeper qualities than those of scholarship. A Freshman at one of our leading colleges was asked, some years ago, how he liked a certain member of Faculty. "He has no heart," was the reply. I dare say that it may have been simply the case of one who did not "wear his heart upon his sleeve"; but to give such an impression to any one is a grave misfortune.

It has been said that what a boy loves, when he leaves school, is worth more to him, and to the nation, than what he knows. This is quite as true of the College graduate. Indeed what we, any of us, know is only important to teach us what — of the ideal — to love and what to abhor. No word

of regard for a teacher from a former pupil is so rewardful as that which tells of impressions for good made on the man's general character.

A statistician of authority has ascertained that there are two States which lead and have long led all others, relatively to their population, in respect to the number of their citizens to whom distinction for their merits is accorded by common consent. They are Massachusetts and Connecticut. It can hardly be doubted that the cause is the possession by each of an ancient university, where for centuries her sons have been trained in the acceptance of high standards of learning and high standards of morals.

I would place these two kinds of standards side by side. If they are not of equal importance in the making of a man, it is because, of the two, in the planning of a university, guidance in morals should be made the highest aim. Nor, probably, can morals be best taught except by the light of religion and the study of the principles of Christianity. Here the university resting on foundations of endowment, like Yale or Harvard, offers better opportunities than do those supported by State appropriations. The limits of our constitutional prohibitions respecting religious freedom are somewhat vague, and there is a "twilight zone" into which it is dangerous

for those to venture whose positions may depend upon the favor of each new legislature. No such zone embarrasses those who act under private charters. Nor do universities accepting the benefit of the Carnegie Foundation, in disclaiming a sectarian character, surrender the power to teach religion.

I would not be understood to deem religious faith or professions essential to the highest morality. For most men it finds support in these, but it may have a life of its own, that is totally independent of their aid.

A university succeeds ill if it does not make plain that on one ground every honest seeker after ultimate truth can find room to stand, — the ground of ethics. The ethics of one age, one country, may not be those of the next; but in each and for each there will be some standard of conduct which it is happiness and glory to attain. The scholar may accept materialism as his philosophy of life. He may believe that death ends all, so far as continuity of individual existence goes. He may find no sufficient evidence to convince him that there is a God. But he will never deny that, if it be necessary to establish a utilitarian basis of ethics, connected in some fashion with the enduring good of the individual man, such a basis exists in the satisfaction of every

man, while living on earth, who has the *mens sibi conscia recti*, and in the not unwarranted hope of some men that they will be remembered on earth after they have left it, with affection, admiration, and reverence.

Whatever be our theories of the Future, it is something worth achieving if, when we leave the Present, there are those who will thus hold us in living memory or fond respect. The loving recollection of a dead mother, the fond respect of his country for a Washington, — what uncounted impulses to good flow out from sentiments like these, the educated man will see: no other can.

The university offers to impart knowledge, and cultivate the power of reasoning, but the great office of knowledge and reasoning is to be a means of reaching something higher — the plane of a pure and lofty and well-ordered life. That this is the end, it may fairly be expected that every teacher will assume. Whatever may be his views of religion, he must agree that all education is directed ultimately, as Mill has said, to making each of us practically useful to our fellow creatures and elevating the character of the race. A by-product may be facility in perfecting material things. The real object is to perfect Man.

Sir Richard Jebb has said that "education consists in organizing the resources of the human being." The resources are there. What is needed is to organize them so as to secure the highest power for the highest service. They must be organized so that they may respond to sudden calls. Nowhere is this ability to act both promptly and wisely in an emergency more wanted than by men in public life. They will find help, for one thing in a cultivated imagination. He who can best anticipate possible conjunctures will be best able to meet them if they occur. The educated man goes armed with general conceptions, and is thus equipped to encounter any particular difficulties.

But emergencies seldom occur. What is of most importance to him is to have a keen sense of the everlasting, heaven-high distinction between right and wrong, — a distinction never more vital than now. In all instruction in ethics, it cannot be too strongly impressed upon the student that it forms, of necessity, in our times, part of the foundation of any sound political government. It creates forces that act and re-act, with unerring accuracy. Aristotle treats of ethics first and politics second, because, he says, the good life can only be fully attained by the citizen of a good

State. Only he will live in an atmosphere that naturally inspires it.

Altruism is a high form of political duty. It is fostered by familiarity with those principles of civil government which we call the "Ideas of 1789," and upon which our American Constitutions are built up. First among these is the maintenance, so far as may be, of equality of opportunity. The main office of the American State is to give to each of its citizens a fair chance to make the most of himself. Hence we are each willing to sacrifice something of our liberty and property. It makes what we retain more secure. The strong thus serve the weak; and the rich the poor.

Modern government all over the world occupies or steadily approaches this position. If we trace back its history, we shall find that it arose out of some pre-existing form of society which rested on a very different ground, and made its object practically, if not avowedly, the aggrandizement of a particular individual or family, or class, at the expense of the rest of the people.

This upward trend of human government cannot be too strongly pressed on the attention of young men. They must be made to feel that, as American citizens, they have inherited a peculiar obligation

to maintain and advance this principle of equality before the law. They must be taught that it by no means involves the acceptance of what, under the name of Socialism, is becoming steadily and everywhere a larger and larger figure in national and in local politics. The strength of Socialism is largely due to a certain cloudiness of doctrine with which its supporters surround it; and to its remoteness from the life of the day. The clearer the light that can be thrown upon it, the better the chance of making its real nature plain. He can best conceive what it would prove in practice, and look ahead to the best purpose, whose training has made him look back far enough to comprehend the necessary relations of the future to the past.

No one deserves the name of an educated man who has not been thus prepared to deal intelligently with the different theories of State Socialism. Here his knowledge of history will serve him in good stead. He will know the difference between Communism and Socialism; between Socialism and Syndicalism, which is its travesty; and he will know how to explain it to others so that they will understand it. He will be able to refer to instances in which the fundamental principles of each system have been put to the test of practice, and have

failed to sustain it. "Knowledges," says Lord Bacon, "are as pyramids, whereof history is the basis."

No university, in the world of our day, can properly omit thorough instruction in civics and the art of government. But this is especially true of the American universities founded and supported by the State. Their rapid increase in numbers, both of students and faculty, cannot but call attention to their especial and paramount duty to give in this way a proper preparation for public service. To them the State gives all. From them it may justly demand all. It has founded them as institutions of good government. They fail of their purpose, if they do not promote it by giving to State and country those fitted to serve each, as occasion offers, and to uphold each against all unmerited attack.

Such men are best produced by those universities which are most thoroughly permeated by a spirit of sincere devotion to truth, and a high sense of duty. The president of one of our colleges, not many years ago, urged, in a Commencement address, the cultivation of this spirit. Truth was the one goal for every student to aim at, always and everywhere. It was to be pursued unfettered by

attachment to any particular doctrines or tenets of the past. If these were good, they could not be held too fast. If they were bad, they could not be dropped too soon. He is not now the president of that institution, though he holds a much higher station. He said to a friend that he had not got half through this address, before he saw from the looks interchanged between the trustees and dignitaries who sat about him upon the platform, that his term of office was nearly finished.

The university education that is thus limited at its sources, by those who control the sources, cannot rise higher than its springs. It gives no breadth of view, no real sense of public duty or of private duty; and this is simply because it is in no true sense education, but the mere pretence of it.

The most thorough course of study, under men of the highest attainments and the noblest character, may bear little fruit, or bad fruit. We must not exaggerate the importance of what is called a liberal education. It puts in our hands a certain capital to trade on. But it is not every one who can be entrusted with the charge of capital. Our best qualities and powers are God-given. Education may improve, but cannot create them. With respect to public office, I had rather have in a

difficult but subordinate place, a man of first rate ability, who had educated himself, than a man of second rate ability who had been educated by others. It may not be so for the first places. There the sobering influences of historical knowledge and philosophical study have a double worth. They strengthen the capacity of judging between courses of policy, and tend to guide towards the safer side. They must have convinced the man that all great governmental changes will take place slowly, if the change is to endure. They have convinced him that the presumptions are against a change, from what has been tried and found fairly good, to that which has been untried. The man also is magnified by his office. He feels that he stands for and acts for the whole people. It weighs upon him, and it also inspires him. A second rate man in the highest station often grows into another being. If he has had a good education, and has never shown himself able to make effective use of it, his official opportunities may teach him this last lesson, and teach it well.

Public speech plays a large part in public service. It helps immensely to secure what is good, and to prevent what is evil. That which we hear impresses most of us far more vividly than what we read. It

is also put together in a very different fashion. Rhetoric has one set of rules for spoken words and quite another for written words.

I have already spoken of the help which education can give towards acquiring the art of literary composition. To write well, whatever endowments nature may have bestowed, requires discipline and practice. But many more can write well than can speak well. Nature makes the orator, and she makes few. Facility of utterance on the platform or in a legislative body, to one who has clear ideas back of it which he desires to enforce, is a great gift. Education seldom creates, but can always enrich it.

Declamation, both at school and college, debate in student societies and class or college meetings, tend directly to promote one's public usefulness in later life. Participation in such exercises teaches some that their part is the grace of silence, and some that they have a talent well worthy of cultivation. Let the declaimer and debater look with confidence to their instructors for good opportunities to improve their gifts, and kindly sympathy. Whoever can talk well before a large assembly, on a subject which he has studied to good purpose, will always be counted among the important men in the community where he belongs.

The growth of our cities, the multiplication of our village centers, the many organizations of a social, or economic character, which our age has developed, all tend to elevate the position belonging to the public speaker. There are more places of assembly, and throughout our country there will seldom be found any great gathering where a serious word, well said, on public questions of the day, will not be well received.

And now, as I close, let us ask where rests the responsibility for marking out the lines of American education. Is it a divided or a centralized responsibility? Have we one or many authorities to which to look?

The shaping of education is in the hands of the States, and there it must remain. The Bureau of Education at Washington may make and often does make helpful suggestions, but it can exercise no control, nor can any other officer or agency of the United States. The German principle of trusting the several States of the empire, not that adopted by Japan, of leaving all to the imperial government, is in harmony with American institutions. We believe that systems of education must be under home rule, and conform to local needs and capabilities. They cannot be identical

in Massachusetts and Montana; in Charleston and in Chicago.

The demands of educational freedom are absolutely opposed to Federal direction of school affairs, and endangered by all grants of aid from the Federal treasury. The agricultural colleges of the country are now, to some extent, sources of peril to the autonomy of the States, in respect of their internal concerns. They familiarize the minds of the students with the idea of Federal dependence, and introduce an extraneous authority to determine policies of instruction and research.

The education of Americans must be American in type. It must impress upon all who receive it our combination of local home rule in most things with supreme control at Washington over a few things. Each is equally necessary for the perpetuity of our institutions.

III

THE EDUCATED MAN AS A VOTER, AND
PRIVATE CITIZEN

THE first duty of the educated man as a voter is to vote, were it only for the sake of the example to others. The elective franchise is one which he who receives is bound to make use of. It is no mere privilege. Its exercise by the citizen of a republic is, under ordinary circumstances, almost his highest obligation. In several of the early American colonies, not to vote was a penal offence. It is to-day in Belgium,¹ Salvador,² and some of the Swiss cantons,³ and Austrian provinces.⁴ Georgia put such a provision in her first Constitution (Art. XII), and it remained in force from 1777 until 1789.

A vote, however, cast from no higher motive than the desire to avoid a fine, will be apt to be ill-bestowed and, in any event, to be carelessly given.

¹ Constitution of 1893, Art. 48.

² Constitution of 1886 The elective franchise is given to those who are eighteen years of age.

³ Schaffhausen, Zurich, Aargau, Thurgau, and Basel-Landschaft.

⁴ Silesia, Moravia, Upper Austria, Lower Austria, Salzburg and Carniola.

Compulsory voting tends also to lessen the number of men who withhold their support from an unworthy nominee of their party. It is far easier for them to keep away from the polls, than to go to them and either scratch his name or vote for the opposing candidate. By all who deem independence of party dictation to be desirable, the absentee, under such conditions, should be recognized as acting within his right.

This is not to say that his course is to be commended. Not to vote is always, in a certain sense, a violation of a trust. The voters in any community are, and must be made to look upon themselves as being, trustees for the rest of their fellow citizens. They are in a minority always. Every electorate is in theory an aristocracy. It is the expression of a distrust in absolute democracy.

Children are not capable of governing their own affairs. Much less, therefore, can they safely be allowed to share in the government of public affairs. Until they reach the age which by common consent is deemed to be that of reasonable intellectual maturity, they are clearly not the best material for a voting constituency. The best, if we accept the principle of universal suffrage, is such of the rest as are not properly excluded from the privilege

of voting for their personal defaults, or — in the opinion of the community — by sex or race.

Assuming the soundness of this principle, it is true nevertheless that the vote of each educated man counts for more than that cast by any other person. In Belgium they recognize this by giving three votes to those having a diploma from an institution of higher learning, or who have completed a course of secondary education of the higher kind, or held some position, public or private, the occupants of which presumably possess at least the knowledge given by such a course.¹

But everywhere, under the broadest rule of universal suffrage, no vote is intrinsically so important as that of the man of superior education. Presumably he knows better than those who have had less instruction what policies deserve support. If he be a man of sense, all who come within the range of his acquaintance give him credit for possessing such knowledge. They look to him, consciously or unconsciously, for guidance. His vote, in this way, counts for more than one.

He may safely start from the position, *Quieta non moveri*. The presumption in an American State is in favor of the existing order of things. It is a

¹ Constitution of 1893, Art. 47.

presumption, however, which has less weight than it should with the people at large. The American mind has been formed in the school of enterprise and success. The United States, in a little over a hundred years, have passed from a position of weakness to a commanding place in the circle of the great powers. They entered the nineteenth century lacking in capital, with a sparse population, and few large business concerns. They entered the twentieth, with a population of ninety millions and great business interests spreading over the world. We have tried many experiments in legislation, and most of them have turned out well. Why not try more? Progress is the hope of the world. We have passed some laws that made for progress. Why not, think many of the people and say not a few of their leaders, seek a further advance in a similar way? Here a recurrence to fundamental principles is especially necessary, and true leadership calls for insistence on the peculiar virtue for us of those, which have been made the foundation of American government. That virtue is not discerned by everyone; not easily discerned by anyone. By the educated man it may and should be.

He is not necessarily a reformer. Every political party which is worthy of long life has a right wing

of conservatives, a left wing of radicals, and between them a large body of those who are neither the one nor the other. In each of these three divisions men of education will be found.

To ardent and hopeful spirits the left wing is the most attractive. It is also the most dangerous, because it has the least benefit from the teachings of experience. In advocating changes in laws, it should be remembered, as Joubert said, that "*Presque tout ce que nous appelons un abus fut un remède, dans les institutions politiques.*"

Reform is a good object to aim at, if the new form proposed is really better, and far better, than the existing form. In most cases, if it be not far better it is not worth while to press its adoption; and for two reasons: first, because Reform is a cry of enthusiasm, and we can only be enthusiastic in striving to attain something far higher than ourselves, — and second, because we may lose more than we gain, if we unsettle existing foundations which are fairly good, by calling attention to their faults, in the hope only of making a slight improvement.

The rank and file of reformers are always sciolists. If their leaders are properly educated and equipped, all may go well. But if the leaders are sciolists too, all is lost from the outset.

A man of that description is often the hardest worker. He lives by faith. He is intoxicated by his enthusiasms. He is nerved by the fixity of his convictions. He is incapable of seeing the objections which stagger wiser men. He may thus do immeasurable harm, in securing what seems to him immeasurable good. It is a great misfortune if he have the training of an educated man, — powerful, but incomplete, — to aid him in his crusade. Especially is this so, if his efforts are directed against any vital part of our constitutional system. In such case, his every word should be taken as a call for the general forces of education to rally, in opposition, for the defence of American institutions.

The vital problem on which thinking men in every modern government are constantly at work is how to maintain individual freedom and independence without crippling the effectiveness of the great commercial organizations by which the large business of the country is carried on. These organizations are almost entirely, and from the first have been, corporations created by the State.

Our Constitution contemplates freedom to every citizen or association of citizens to enter into trade between the States, as well as in the States. It also contemplates the regulation of each of these two

kinds of trade by different governments, the State regulating its internal trade and the United States regulating that between the States. A corporation is an association of individuals under a common name, and generally they are citizens of the United States.

Shall we abide by this scheme which the fathers of the republic devised? Can we safely depart from it?

Every well-instructed American has read enough of history to know that ours is the first successful attempt to frame a government with a central sovereign power, supreme within a narrow sphere, and numerous smaller sovereign powers, each supreme within a larger sphere.¹ He of all men ought to feel that the safety of American institutions lies in maintaining this combination in working order. Whatever party ties he may acknowledge, he is untrue to his country if he is not outspoken in defence of this method of distributing power. It is indispensable to have a strong government at

¹ Europeans, and particularly the Germans, often deny, in the face of what we have done in this direction, that such a combination can leave any true sovereignty in the smaller power. An academic school of American jurists sympathizes with their position; but it finds no support in the decisions of our courts, and these are our sailing-chart. See Willoughby, *Principles of the Constitutional Law of the U. S.*, 6.

Washington to deal with matters not open to the States. It is equally indispensable to preserve the sovereignty of the States in matters that are, under the principles of the Constitution, confided to them.

Our American system of higher education naturally tends to establish a belief in the truth of this last proposition. It is a system created and administered by the States, and by each State for itself. It differs widely in the East from what it is in the West. The common schools all over the country are conducted on a plan much the same; but between the State University and the endowed university there is a great gulf fixed. This cannot but be felt by their faculties and students, and it predisposes them to feel that here, at least, there has been found no need of Federal control.

There is, however, a strong counter influence in the opposite direction. American scholars look out on the world from a height, — that on which their education has placed them. They observe that the tendencies of modern political thought in most countries are towards greater and greater centralization of power in the hands of one man or a few men, subject to checks by the people, either by direct vote or through their representatives. The

educated man is especially liable to be affected by the currents of world-politics. He knows most about them. He naturally wishes his own country to be in line with the advance elsewhere of political thought. I do not think he always appreciates how the difference in history and conditions between the United States and Europe renders impossible here, under our constitutional system, much that is possible there.

He can, on the other hand, more fully than most others, appreciate the immense sentimental strength that has gathered about the office of President of the United States, and its influence in developing the spirit of nationalism, as opposed to maintaining, unabated, the sovereignty of the States. The chief magistrate of any political government, as of any ecclesiastical government, stands for the government, for the State, for the church, whose head he is. The loyalty and reverence due to that naturally flows out in large part to him. He is identified with it. To cherish such sentiments and to express them is right and useful, so far as they promote nationalism within proper bounds. But the bounds of nationalism with us are narrow, and — what is not less important — it is a short step from nationalism to imperialism. President Lincoln took it, in the

arbitrary arrests which he sanctioned, during civil war.

All our Presidents first and then Congress have taken it in ordering the affairs of our colonial dependencies. They were right in taking it, for the Constitution of the United States is a Constitution made for the people of the States that are free, united, and not for subject peoples. But when Jefferson found it so natural to do when the Louisiana purchase was made, and what we have found so easy, if not necessary, to do, on a larger scale in the Philippines, by establishing there an imperial government, is silently sowing seeds of imperialism at home among those unused to free discrimination in political theories.

The President of the United States is the representative of the country and of every State as to the outside world. He only is in direct communication with foreign powers. He only directs the course of troops and ships of war. He is the embodiment of national power. He bears the Mission which to most men is the perpetual symbol of Right.

Shortly after the Constitutional Convention of 1787 had completed its work, a lady, meeting Franklin, asked him whether this new Constitution

would give us a republic or a monarchy. "A republic, Madam," was the answer, "if we can keep it."¹ We can only keep it, — keep it, that is, otherwise than in name, — by maintaining the dignity and sovereignty of the States within their spheres, and by steadily resisting all unnecessary extensions of Federal power.

Here is the opportunity and the public duty of every educated man. He may act in that direction effectively, whatever be his party affiliations. No political party has ever pledged itself to what it deemed improper and unnecessary extensions of Federal power.

There have been, almost uninterruptedly, two great parties in the United States, though each has, from time to time, gone under different names. One has been generally in favor of a stricter construction of the Federal powers; the other of a more liberal construction of them.

President Hadley once said that that system of government has the best chance of long-continued life, which allows the highest degree of individual variation, without destroying authority as a whole. It is so, still more, with political parties. Those which endure are those which are broad enough in

¹ Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, III, 85.

their beliefs to comprehend many men of many views, widely differing from each other, and yet each resolved that such differences shall work no division. If the educated man has not learned toleration he has not learned much. He of all men can best afford to identify himself with a party, for he knows that it involves no sacrifice of his ideals to a level of uniformity. It may be his duty to hold back. It may be his duty to push forward. It is always his duty to recognize the right of others to do the same, although they may be moving in the opposite direction to that chosen by himself.

In England it has often happened that parties have changed their ground, and are found in one generation advocating what, in the preceding generation, they opposed.

There has been little of this in the United States. The Republican party of to-day is in the main a descendant of the ancient Federalist party. The Democratic party of to-day is in the main a descendant of the ancient Republican party. Neither party has been always and uniformly consistent in its platform assertions, but the main principle of each has been well known. However near the right wing of one of these parties may approach the left wing of the other, the main bodies will remain

apart. They will remain apart for solid reasons. Each represents a tenable theory of American government. In the course of our political history the people have trusted each with power. Educated men have belonged to each, and with good right. Educated men have generally controlled each, and generally will. It would be a sad day for American institutions, if a great party should ever rise up, the vital principles of which no educated man could honestly and rightfully support. Such an event I view as almost impossible; but should it occur, that party would not remain long in power. The forces of education would disintegrate and destroy it.

The educated man should always and everywhere stand for the doctrine that a member of a political party is not necessarily pledged either to vote for every person whom his party may nominate for office, or to support every measure which his party platform may urge. He is — or should be — a member of that party whose principles on the whole best commend themselves to his judgment. It may possess some which he deems unsound. If so, he should maintain his liberty to oppose them, without forfeiting his general party allegiance. To vote for everything which his party may hurrah for, in the

wild excitement of a political convention, is no necessary part of his duty. He is to be never the servant of a party. His party is his servant; — his, as one of the people for whose benefit government exists. He supports it because he believes it is the best party to serve the public interests.

Spinoza identified the slavery of man with the strength of the passions, and the freedom of man with the power of the reason. Yielding to the force of political emotion and party pressure simply enslaves the man whose reason tells him to resist and oppose. So a man of superior education betrays his trust, if he looks on his party as giving him, as to any matter of right and duty, a means of going *incognito*, and avoiding political responsibility. He must come out in the open and let others know his convictions, wherever there is a moral question to be decided. He must judge the situation for himself. Parties are not devices to save men from the vexation of thinking.

One moral question is attendant on every election to important office. It addresses itself especially to campaign managers, but it vitally concerns every citizen. How far can money be legitimately used to secure a party victory?

It is fashionable to look at corruption in elections

as a necessary incident of our system of government. The educated man knows that, when it exists, it comes commonly from excess of political ambition, or from abuse of official power. Rousseau said, in the days of eighteenth century parliamentary boroughs, that in England men were only free on one day, every few years, when they voted for members of parliament; and that they made such a bad use of their liberty on that day, that they deserved to lose it, and had lost it. We have no Crown ready to buy votes. We have, with the spread of civil service reform, continually fewer and fewer offices to be the prizes of political success. We can stamp corruption out if and as a public sentiment is created that condemns it and all approaches to it, unreservedly. The educated man can do much to forward that result.

He can work effectively in that direction, though holding no office in State or party. Talking with one's neighbors, or writing a letter to a newspaper, is often more productive of ultimate results than a platform speech or caucus resolution. Public business is controlled by public sentiment, and public sentiment is what private citizens think, and feel, and say, in the ordinary intercourse of daily life. It is this that colors and indeed makes the life of the

nation, and educated men have it in their power to interpret and to lead it.

Public opinion needs an interpreter. It also needs safe guides.

The place of education is in the front ranks of all real national advance. It is one of the first causes of that advance. It has the right of the line. But all advances are not real. It is for the educated man to find out which is, and which is not. It is for him, next, to take his rightful part in the support of the one, and the defeat of the other. It is never his duty to urge the passage of laws, however sound in principle they may seem to him, which he can see that the mass of the people do not want. His duty, under such conditions, is, first, to ask himself seriously if the majority are not in the right, and, if not convinced of that, then to labor to build up a public sentiment calling for such legislation. In that his education puts him on a high vantage ground.

There is always an inarticulate cry, proceeding from the mass of the community, for something better than they now possess. What this is, they may half feel, but do not know, and cannot put into definite expression. To do this is the work of the educated man. He must be their voice; and he who is will find himself their leader.

There will be such leaders in great things. There will also — what is more important — be such leaders in small things. Few can help a whole people, by rising to the place of a national figure. Many can and do render what, in the aggregate result, is as great a service, by leadership in the improvement of local conditions, and the support of minor measures that pave the way toward great reforms.

It is in this larger company, that every educated man owes it to society to take his part. He owes it to his own generation by whose co-operation his life and liberty and property are protected. He owes it to the next generation, for whom ours must prepare a place. He owes it to past generations, to whose endowments he is generally indebted for a large part of his education, and of whose acquirements and literature he is an heir. This debt he ought to pay with interest. He must do his part to make the conditions of life better in the future than those which he has known. He must try to do for his successors in the community what his predecessors did for him. You and I must pay our debts of inheritance, to use the words of David Ritchie, "by endeavoring to hand on to those that shall come after, the privileges we do *not* enjoy."

They will be the privileges of freemen. They will be equally open to all. The educated man is bound to exert his influence to guard the rights of the people and the community, as a whole. He must, be he a specialist or not, command a wider horizon than can most of those around him. He can see that to favor class interests is seldom to promote public interests. He can see that what seems to the advantage of a particular city or country or senatorial district may be a damage to the State at large. He can see, and see more clearly, if a private citizen, than if in public office, that the office of a representative in a legislative body is first of all to represent the entire people, rather than any particular locality, and that the electors have no just right to expect from one whom they have helped to put in office any greater consideration for their special interests, because they and he live in the same town or county.

In speaking of class interests, I would not be understood to recognize the existence of any social classes in the United States. The term "social classes" is justly applicable only where political society has established various kinds of personal *status*, involving some kind of subjection of those having one kind to those having another. American

government recognizes no such institutions. The educated man ought to set his face against any appeal to "class-consciousness." There is no ground for the existence of such a thing in the United States, and can be none, because with us there is no social class into which or out of which men cannot pass at will, unimpeded by law.

In dealing with any questions of such a sort, a well-trained mind is of special service. Every educated man observes society through a magnifying glass. What is microscopic or invisible to most, stands out in his view large and clear. He sees qualifications of dogmas, shades of meaning, attachments to propositions. If, in the phrase of the day, there are "strings" to them, it does not escape his observation.

His business is to give his contemporaries, so far as he can, the benefit of this acquired power of his. He has, in this, something akin to the faculty of the artist; whose function it is to show us how much the ideal rises above the actual, and shines through the actual, to those who have eyes to see.

The man in private station will often if not always, in attempting this, find a kindlier audience, than if he occupied a public position. He

stands, apparently, on the same level with all whom he addresses, and he speaks with an unselfish interest.

The best office of an educated man is to give high and ennobling ideals to his fellow citizens. They are needed in our age of conflict with a materialism armed with so immense a power, more than ever before. He must first have them, himself; and he can, if he make good use of what has been taught him, — if he take himself at his best. A few "high hours," as Emerson called them, come in every life. It is to enable us to attain them that the rest are given us, and it is our business to make them more and more productive, every year. No way is better than to cherish them with the hope of passing them on to other men.

The educated man is no good citizen unless he exerts such influence as belongs to him to build up the general character of the community and strengthen its moral motive. Rousseau, in *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, makes one of his characters say that suicide is a theft from the human family. Such a theft also, though in less degree, is committed by every one whom society has trained in the higher learning, and who then allows himself to become so self-centered and self-surrounded that, though

retaining his life, he exerts no effort to make it useful to others.

A liberal education, obtained at any American college is, in part at least, an unearned gift. The State may be the giver. Past generations may be. But however this may be, the student never pays for what he gets, when he gets it. The debt remains, and the resulting duty to pay it later, when he can. He pays it best by rendering that service to others which it has put it in his power to give. He must be a leader in making the most of life for himself, and in helping others to make the most of it for themselves. He knows fairly well his own capabilities. He must convince his neighbors of theirs. He must show them their possibilities of self-improvement, and the real secret of a strong and fine life.

For one thing, that is self-control, with its fruit of freedom from fear. The wise man, said Emerson, in a storm at sea, "prays God not for safety from danger, but for deliverance from fear." It is the storm within, which endangers his true life, not the storm without. This may be an esoteric lesson, hard to learn; but a practical rendering of it for every man is that there is no ground for dreading ruin from the success of any political party in State

or nation. History assures us of this as a permanent characteristic of American life, and the historical student must share his knowledge of it with those around him.

When any large public question is under discussion, the possessor of a strong mind and high attainments has some such opportunity, and it is well worth his while to use it. Man always is at his best when he interests himself in politics; using that term in its original sense, — as that which belongs to the government of a community. To do this was virtually forbidden, in the older forms of political society, to all but a favored few. In our country it has, from the first, been possible for every one. The American, then, who does not interest himself in politics renounces his birth-right. Having a right to show himself at his best, he is content with the second best.

If the uneducated man is found in this position, he has some excuse. He knows his weakness. He dreads to assume the labor of studying problems of difficulty, with an untrained mind. The educated man has a larger responsibility. His training has been for the purpose of helping him to make the most of himself, — the most of life. It is doing that, to exercise a whole-

some and intelligent influence on the politics of the day.

How shall he, as a citizen, labor to the most purpose to better the State?

There is something not wholly unattractive to a man of powerful and well-disciplined mind in such a philosophy as that of Nietzsche. May it not be so that the true worth-accent of human life ought to rest alone on its highest examples, and that the only important thing to forward is the higher advancement of those already most advanced? Shall we believe with Carlyle that the history of the world is the biography of great men? The student of large social movements will be more apt to declare it to be the story of the average man and the average level of the community, in every generation. Certainly it is so in a country such as ours. This is a natural consequence of republican institutions.

Every American citizen is to a certain extent a public man. He has an equal share in the sovereignty of his State and nation. He is called on to approve or disapprove by his vote at the next election the manner in which the sovereign power has been exercised by the men in office. It is for him, as much as for any other man, to say whether

they — or their party — shall continue in possession of that power. Every American citizen, therefore, is under a special obligation to school himself in respect to the nature of government, — its limitations and its possibilities.

One fundamental conception he must grasp firmly, — and the better educated he is, the more firmly, because it may seem illusory. It is this: There is not one and the same standard for the individual and for that association of individuals, which we call the State. The government may, in case of need, sometimes do — and do fairly — what to anyone of its people would be unpermissible and illegal. Take, for instance, the rules of property right. Under these the State can fairly and properly give itself special privileges. Let us suppose that a taxpayer becomes financially embarrassed. The State can and commonly does insist on a preference for taxes due, over his other creditors. The public debt must be paid to the last cent, even if it consumes the man's entire estate. So the management of the post office is a government monopoly, and we have laws which very properly exclude, under pain of fine or imprisonment, all competition from those desiring to set up a private mail. So far forth, our policy is frankly socialistic.

Where, again, the government is in a position, through its executive or legislative departments, to deal with the claims of individuals complaining of wrongs, it can act even in violation of what in courts would be the unquestionable rules of justice.

Congress, many years ago, granted bounties to sugar growers. The courts were appealed to and decided that such legislation was unconstitutional. But, meanwhile large sums had been spent by the sugar planters, in reliance on its validity. Congress thereupon appropriated as much as the bounties would have called for, to save them from ruin. The courts were again appealed to, but they held that Congress could thus recognize the equity of the planters' claims. It was simply doing what an honest man's conscience would, under similar circumstances, make him do. A similar position was taken when the United States consented to set aside a judgment of a commission of international arbitration rendered against Mexico, in favor of certain claimants who had deceived the arbitrators by false testimony. They had transferred their claims to *bona fide* purchasers, who had collected the award. The United States nevertheless refused to be even a seeming party to such a fraud, though

at the cost of repaying the sums in question to Mexico out of the national treasury.¹

On the other hand, the educated man can see why nations may be or seem selfish in situations where a private individual might not be able to quiet his conscience, should he act in the same way. The nation is a trustee for all its people. To give up or give away what is theirs may be a breach of trust, in essence, though not in form. It is, therefore, generally the duty of a government to stand upon its rights.

So far as concerns private individuals, the enforcement by government of obligations between man and man rests mainly upon the courts. The educated man owes it to his education to do what he can to strengthen public confidence in our judicial system. It has brought peace, order, and security to our people, but most of them have a very imperfect knowledge of the reason why. They do not understand that courts have created the dignity in society of the individual man, by giving him the aid of the whole people, if necessary, to enforce his rights. They may not understand that it would

¹ *La Arbra Silver Mining Co. v. United States*, 175 United States Reports, 423; Moore, *International Law Digest*, VII, 68.

be hazarded, if not lost, were judicial decisions to be controlled or revised by popular majorities, obtained, as often they surely would be, by the efforts of defeated litigants.

Life consists in sharing a succession of relations between men. One of these relations is that of the aggregation of all the people inhabiting a particular territory, represented by its civil government, to each of these people individually and to each of the groups with which these individuals may be identified. Each individual in a civilized state, so far as he can be said to have personal rights against other individuals or groups of individuals, is a person created by civilization, under the influences of religion.

Primitive society is a group or a combination of groups. The group is a personality; the combination of groups is a personality; but the individual at this stage of human development is not a personality. Organized society does not deal with him. It deals with his group. If he commits a crime, it looks to his group to punish him. If he acquires property, he acquires it for his group. If his services are wanted in war, they are called for by his group.

Modern government has come, through the influences of civilization, to recognize the individual

as a political personality. It recognizes him as having rights. It assures them to him, and does this no longer by the action of a particular group, but through courts, superior in force to any group, because they are backed by the force of all the people in all the groups.

To support the authority of the courts of justice, then, is one of the first duties of every citizen. It is for the educated man to show him why. History tells, or rather the philosophy of history, and that must be taken at second hand by most men. Only the educated man comes to know it at first hand. Only he can speak with authority of what courts are, or any other of the institutions which, during thousands of years, have been the slow growth of social evolution; yet those alone are the real foundation of the State.

IV

THE EDUCATED MAN IN PUBLIC OFFICE

MEN of superior education fill the higher offices in our country, in a proportion far in excess of that which they bear, as a class, to the rest of the community. The higher the office, the greater is this proportion. Of the twenty-three men who have been elected Presidents of the United States, only seven, — Washington, Jackson, Van Buren, Polk, Taylor, Lincoln, and Cleveland — had not had the advantage of a college training. While these include three illustrious names, the list of Presidents, taken as a whole, although showing that native talent, high character, and good use of opportunity for self-improvement may carry their possessors to any height of power, proves also that the greatest stations in public life seldom go to men of middling ability, unless it has been disciplined and steadied by careful cultivation.

Similar results are apparent in all the other lines of high public service. Dean West of Princeton has recently stated, that among our American youths who have gone to college, are comprehended nearly

a third of all who have ever been representatives in Congress, more than a third of all who have ever been senators of the United States, nearly half of our cabinet officers, and almost all the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. In the more important offices of the State governments the proportion of men of superior education is less, but still relatively very large.

In the preceding lectures I have spoken of the reasons for this, and also of the duty which every educated man owes to his country to give her the benefit of whatever he has learned, to the measure of his opportunity. But in taking office he makes an essential change of position. He no longer speaks only for himself. He no longer has the same freedom to follow his own lead. More depends upon his action. What he does is largely at others' risk. He has, therefore, less right of political independence.

On the other hand, he now has better means of information as to public matters. This may change his views of political policy. He has gained a sounder basis of opinion. In most cases he was elected as the nominee of a political party. This implies a certain obligation to support the main measures which it is understood to favor. The educated man, like every other member of a party, has become such

because it, on the whole, was the one best representing the policies which he prefers. If he be put in office, it is because he belonged to it. He owes it something. If he were not ready to act with it, in ordinary cases, he was wrong in accepting office. at its hands.

The President of the United States is the only public officer who may be expected to keep his mind wholly free from local prepossessions. The Governors of States come next, but each of them is, in a sense, the appointed guardian of the special interests of the sovereign power whose head he is. If it be an agricultural State, he must endeavor fully to protect the interests of the farmer. If it be a manufacturing State, he must, in like manner, have regard to those of the factory. Above all he must stand for the constitutional equality and sovereign power — sovereign, that is, within their spheres — of each and every State.

No one can see as plainly as the man of broad education how vital to American institutions it is that the balance of power between the States and the United States, and the equal measure of power held by every individual State, should be kept unimpaired.

Lord Bacon, in his treatise on the Advancement

of Learning, said that the best of the public men in ancient Rome were those who "either, being consuls, inclined to the people, or being tribunes, inclined to the senate." So perhaps the educated man, holding high executive position under our dual system of government who, being a Federal official, inclines to minimize the sovereignty of the United States, or who, being a State official, inclines to minimize that of the States, does most credit to the education which he has received.

The educated American has not an equal chance with the educated man in most other countries, to serve the public in a public way. We have no leisured class, with recognized opportunities and duties as to public service. We distribute even executive and judicial offices largely on a basis of locality. Goldwin Smith said of George William Curtis that "unfortunately he lived in an electoral district where the opposite party had the majority, and thus, by the fatuous localism which the Americans have imposed upon themselves, he was debarred from doing his best for the country."

If such a man happens, by some stroke of public good fortune, to have an opportunity of serving the people, he cannot forget that local circumstances

are always to be considered in shaping his political course. The representative in Congress, for instance, of a district in which there are large manufacturing interests benefiting by a high protective tariff, will find both employers and employees disinclined to a change of system which would, or in their judgment might, be injurious to them. However advantageous to the country at large the lower duties might be, he knows that his continuance in office may depend on his resisting the reduction and, probably, what is more important to him, that he was selected and sent to Congress for that very purpose.

Such considerations will not justify him in doing what he knows to be a positive wrong. They will rightly have weight in determining his duty in matters where there is room for reasonable argument on both sides. Abstract theories are not always safe guides through practical conditions. They gather limitations as they proceed. The rule of Right may be invariable, but who is wise enough always to discern it?

If to any leader of the people, however, it remains obscure as to some particular measure or policy, that is broad and large in character, he may be reasonably sure that the people, as a whole, will

see it more clearly, and certain that they will cast their votes according to their moral convictions. Were this not so, our system of government would have fallen to pieces, long ago.

But why is it so? What is the real source and strength of popular morality? By what lines of thought are these most surely ascertained?

The educated man, in measuring the influence which he can and should exert upon his fellow citizens, finds himself put to a choice between two schools of philosophy. Is mankind ultimately directed along its course by interior intuitions, or by exterior associations and experiences? If by interior intuitions, he who would serve as a guide to others has but a narrow field of metaphysics, bordered on one side by sentiment and on the other by rhetoric, to explore. If by exterior associations and experiences, his studies must be as wide as the world.

There is no doubt as to which discipline it is the easier to embrace. There is none as to which is most identified with the fundamental assumptions of our American governments. There is none as to which affords the strongest leverage to move a whole people.

The people, as a whole, believe that certain moral

principles are innate in human character; that there is such a thing as a moral standard, towards which another thing that is within us, and which we call conscience, urges us on; and, finally, that there is a God over all, almighty and omniscient. Whoever can best appeal to these convictions, and best squares his life to what they necessarily involve, will have the largest following in public life. He professes a philosophy which ennobles common things, and is apprehensible by the uneducated, as well as by the educated.

It is a philosophy peculiarly adapted to uphold republican institutions. They suffer from the want of a visible sovereign authority. They furnish no king or emperor to personify it in all its fulness, and so to draw to himself the spontaneous loyalty and reverence of the people. Their adherents must then go higher, and claim that these institutions stand for perpetual truths, ordained of God.

Of course, it is not intended to maintain that any political leader can ignore the force of human association, custom, and experience. All men, and the educated man particularly, will necessarily have some acquaintance with it; and whoever understands it best will pay it the most regard. But the predominant philosophy of popular leadership is

that which rests on an inborn and unlearned sense of right and wrong.

Right, with most men, is coupled with religion, and it is but a small minority of the people with whom religion does not count. The stars in their courses are perpetual witnesses to a realm of law; and few can watch them without a conviction that we are part of a larger order of things than we can measure, and an order established by a law-giver, who also made it possible for us to be members of it.

Here in the United States, in our country of popular education, the collective and intelligent opinion of the community upon any moral issue, clearly put before it, is, under normal conditions, always well-motived. It is the fruit of the past, but has ripened in the present. Schopenhauer is wrong, at least for America, when he declares that "*Jedes einzelne Akt hat einen Zweck; das gesammte Wollen, keinen.*" The collective will, here, is always to uphold the right, — right as it seems to the community. And if education has done this for us, it can do it, in God's own time, for the world.

The educated man will seldom fail to feel the far-reaching force of religion in human government. He sees that the strongest foundation on which to build up any broad measure of social betterment is

that of a higher morality. The State papers that appeal, in sincerity and truth, to these deep sources of power, carry the most weight. Here is the hope of the social reformer, if he gains political power. He may rely on the conscience of the people, and in a measure on the conscience of the world.

Life is a continuous adjustment, says Herbert Spencer, of internal relations to external relations. We tend to be whatever our environment calls for. In proportion to our quick response to the demands it makes, is life sweet and strong and safe.

The environment of each great nation is now the world. There is a law fit for the world, and at bottom there is but one. It is what we imperfectly describe as the divine law. We are perhaps not so sure as once, whether all that we thus name is what the world has claimed for it. The new philosophy of pragmatism makes us distrustful of abstract theories, with its insistence that the best definition of truth is that which works best.

Whether he holds himself a pragmatist or not, the educated man knows that the best laws to pass are those which will operate the most smoothly in daily practice. It is a truism that legislation must never be far in advance of public opinion. Law-makers are to find out that opinion and, as a French

writer has said, not so much by listening to those who speak, as to those who are silent. Most are silent. "The Forgotten Man" of Professor Sumner is the ordinary citizen.

What public sentiment approves public sentiment will respect, if it take the form of law. The freer the government, the more does such respect count for, and the more important it is that it should extend both to the laws and to those who administer them. Nowhere is this axiom of politics more self-evident than in a republic.

American government rests on popular respect for law. Respect brings obedience. The chief executive officers of our country, our States, or our cities, stand before the people for the force of law. They should receive that respect which is a rightful and natural incident of their office. No one knows so well the importance of this as the educated man. No one feels it so deeply as the educated man, who occupies such an office.

Human nature craves some embodiment of superior authority. It is never at its best in any man unless ruled by a spirit of reverence for a higher power. This spirit is natural in monarchies, particularly if there be a national church of which the king is head. Decentralization in religious authority

and decentralization of civil authority generally go together; but not always, and never necessarily. They did not go together at the time of the Protestant Reformation, nor yet during the French Revolution. There, religious authority disappeared for the moment, but only to appear with accentuated centralization at the call of Napoleon.

There is a universal longing at the bottom of the human heart for something to reverence. The most ardent Roman Catholic may also be the most ardent lover of civil liberty. He needs it the more because he has voluntarily surrendered his religious liberty.

It is the redeeming feature of European militarism that it teaches respectful submission to authority and reverence for those entrusted with it. Great Britain and the United States stand apart from the other great powers in not providing such a source of obedience to law, and requiring a resort to it. The British need it less than we, for they have a king who symbolizes authority, and whose elevation above all others is secured and fortified by the social traditions of a thousand years. It has led us to elect five Presidents of the United States because they had distinguished themselves in military service, and so identified themselves

with the flag, that the honor due to that came naturally to them. England, on the other hand, has only once in her parliamentary history appointed one famous as a military commander prime minister, and the Duke of Wellington's term of office as such lasted but a year.

For us, then, whose easiest opportunity for the culture of personal reverence and respect for personal authority is given by service in the militia, or the army of the United States, it is the more important to advance the dignity of high civil office. With no king to personify for a life-time the sacredness of the State; no hereditary nobility or gentry; no State church; the hunger of human nature for something visible and authoritative to bow down before exaggerates the position of a great General, and therefore, needs direction towards those standing first in civil station. If they are educated men, they have so far forth the better title to respect, and they have the stronger appreciation of how much the show of that respect, as a social convention, does for the government they represent.

The public men of our country to-day are not less worthy to receive such regard, than were their predecessors in office. They have been schooled in a larger field. They deal with larger interests.

In the first edition of the *American Commonwealth*, Mr. Bryce told us that those whom we called our statesmen were, as a rule, not types of the highest and strongest American manhood. Nor, he continued, is there much occasion in the United States for those classes of public men which are necessary in the great nations of Europe; for Europe needs, and the United States do not, those able to determine foreign and colonial policy, those who are apt at constructive work in social and economic reform, and those who can be efficient heads of departments.

When, after twenty years, he came back here as ambassador from Great Britain, he found that all these needs of the old world had become needs of the new. Americans can no longer be content to trust themselves to the rule of parliamentary debaters and platform orators. They have come to face large questions of colonial government, and world-politics; of substituting for the common law as to economic questions a statute law dealing with them from new points of view; of elevating federal bureaus to federal departments; and of multiplying each.

There is occasion here, which thirty years ago did not exist, in a hundred directions, for careful

study by thoughtful and well-read men. They cannot but see that we are, with the growing solidarity of the world, on the brink of a new social era. Its story is yet to be told. We cannot forecast it with any certainty. But it is to be an era of new politics, which must be accompanied and brought in by a new ethics.

The nature of political science has largely changed and broadened out during the last half century. Its aim formerly was to show how to fit the government of a people to the conditions of that people. It was something of local application. What it had of general principles was only important in determining the mode of such application. Then came the ocean cable, to bind the world together in point of time. The opening up of Africa followed, and the formation of the Congo Free State. Europe pushed beyond the fringe of civilization which in ten thousand years had hardly spread beyond the coast line, and marked off her new spheres of influence. England seized upon ancient Egypt. France laid her hands upon Algiers, Tunis, and then Morocco, to be followed by Italy, reaching after Tripoli. Russia meanwhile has been creeping into China and Persia. Japan has entered the family of nations, and now holds her place among the great

powers. The United States buy Alaska; construct an isthmian canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific; assume a protectorate over Cuba; reach into Asia, and seize the Philippines. China, Persia, and Turkey accept republican institutions.

Political Science must meet these new conditions. The world feels this. The court of international arbitration, now established at the Hague, is its first effort to deal with world-politics from a world standpoint. But what principles shall this court apply? And what principles shall nations apply in their dealings with each other, which precede controversy or prevent it?

President Hadley, in a thoughtful paper written towards the close of the last century, claimed for ethics the first place in political science. As political science expands, so must political ethics. There may be, and perhaps must be, as things go now, two kinds of ethics to be applied by the same science, — national ethics, and world ethics.

The laws of any particular people must be limited and ruled by their own, locally accepted, standards of morals and conduct. The laws governing the dealings of one people with other peoples must be those of universal obligation. Here may at last be yet realized the thought of stoic philosophy, that

there is, could we only discern it, one law for all men and all things. The six Conferences held at the Hague during the last twenty years, two for the advancement and unification of Public International Law, and four for the advancement and unification of Private International Law, have brought the nations of the world closer together than ever before, in the bonds of common rules of legal procedure. "There shall not," was Cicero's prediction, "be one law at Rome, another at Athens; one now, another hereafter; but among all nations and in all time, there shall obtain a law one and the same."¹ Already jurists in several countries have prepared draft codes, looking to such an end. The latest, covering over a thousand pages, combines the project of a world-law and a world-government, through an international legislative and judicial assembly.² They are pushing on in the development of theories faster and farther than the men in authority. But it is from private citizens that one always looks for the initiative in law reform and political progress. They propose and legislators

¹ "*Non erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et apud omnes gentes et omni tempore, una eademque lex obtinebit.*"

² New Code of International Law. Jerome Internoscia. New York, 1910.

select. The function of selection is more important than that of suggestion, and the faculty of discrimination which it demands belongs especially to well-trained minds. Those who possess them will also be apt to have the courage to maintain against all-comers a policy once deliberately chosen.

The rapid extension during recent years, of the principle of arbitration between nations by standing treaties is due almost wholly to the labors of men of superior education, in high office.

What general canons of conduct, now, should be adopted by public men, whom education has lifted above the ordinary level of their fellow citizens? Such an one, after as well as before assuming office, will be tolerant. He knows that there is good in everything. He will not be borne away by mean suspicions. He will not hastily attribute bad motives to political opponents. He will not readily believe that they are defaulters, or conspirators to achieve some scheme of public plunder. He will not be apt to charge upon all the low views of honesty that, in every community, characterize a few. He will not be always blind to what is sound in business life and social principles, and eager only to discover that which is unsound and unclean.

A dog has a remarkable sense of smell, but I never saw one smell a flower. He is interested in what is rank or foul. He runs with his nose to the ground. There are men who act, according to their powers and opportunities, much in the same way. There are such men in high official station. But rarely are they educated men.

Tolerance has its limits. There are unsavory things that cannot safely be overlooked. Class self-interest is one, when it aims to serve itself at public cost, for which there will be no corresponding public benefit.

One of the heaviest responsibilities of official life is the obligation to stand up against the pressure of powerful organizations to secure special favors and privileges by law. Such organizations have great political influence; but it comes largely from the unfounded apprehensions of this or that party manager, who overestimates their ability to control nominating conventions, or the votes which they can command on election day. The people will be found on the side of any public man who makes it clear to them that he has been fighting their battles, by opposing the struggle of a class to profit at their expense.

Public officers in America act under a peculiar

responsibility by reason of the universal absolutism of the courts. In no other country does the judiciary hold as important a place as in the United States, because here they have — and under the protection of our institutions dare to exercise — the immense power of declaring statutes unconstitutional and therefore void. This prerogative belongs equally to the judges of the States and the United States. Any State Judge from the highest to the lowest can declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional and refuse to enforce it, in the same manner in which he could deal with a statute of the State, though subject to ultimate review by the Supreme Court of the United States.

The bench must, therefore, as respects its higher positions, be filled by men having at least a fair legal education; and that, under modern conditions, calls for instruction in much that would once have been classed among what we have named "culture" subjects of study.

But judges only pass upon the validity of statutes if they chance to be relied on as a ground of action or defence in some pending law suit. Many a statute stands for years without being thus questioned. Many of doubtful constitutionality are never attacked at all. The

possibility that the validity of any and every statute may be some day challenged in court throws, however, a peculiar responsibility on the American legislator. He is himself under an obligation, as complete as that resting upon the judiciary, to advocate no measure which contravenes the Constitution. He must study every proposition for a new law with this in mind. He must study it also with relation to all its consequences.

Particularly is this true of propositions to amend one of our American Constitutions. A written Constitution is an organic and harmonious entirety. Whether well-planned or ill-planned, it is planned as a whole, each part in respect to the other parts. It cannot, therefore, be substantially altered in any direction without risk of its being thrown out of balance.

An unwritten Constitution, on the contrary, while the fruit of ages, has grown up unsymmetrically and almost imperceptibly. To alter it is simply to continue this process. We Americans have a very different problem. Our constitutional amendments must, therefore, be more carefully considered, and with reference to their remote effects, so far as these can be anticipated, by the most diligent thought and reflection.

Here is a task in the performance of which the man of superior education in a legislative body has a great advantage, particularly if he have that great quality of a statesman, — activity of imagination.

He can anticipate the action of the courts. He can stifle a wrong at its inception.

It will be only by careful examination and painstaking inquiry. The indirect consequences of any new piece of legislation are far more numerous and far more important than those which are direct. Only well-trained minds can anticipate many of them. And the highest education can never enable a man to forecast them all.

In America one is quite sure that well-trained minds, sooner or later, will trace out these consequences. This falls to our Judges. They will be quick to see how an alteration in one of the rules of law may affect the working of others, because this will tell, in determining whether the new statute does or does not square with the constitutional guaranties of individual right. Often its effect will be found such as to produce a benefit to a few at the cost of injustice to the community. He who finds this out first, without waiting for some lawsuit to develop the wrong, has won a place among public benefactors. Still more of a benefactor is the

member of a legislature who perceives the impracticability of some such proposition, before it can take the shape of law, and sees to it that it is rejected.

Such a task is not an easy one. The sponsors of the measure will be ready to defend it, and plausible reasons for adopting it will probably not be wanting. The objector has not the spur of any personal end to serve. He is likely to be a busy man, with little leisure. It is to such men that the duty of opposition particularly appeals. They can discharge it more rapidly and yet more effectively than any others. Their mental machinery works smoothly, and without friction.

Am I calling for time and thought which outrun the powers of most men, whether immersed in other business or not, in view of what the common routine of legislative work requires of all, and of the necessary duties of ordinary life? Taking on additional work of a new kind is often the best relief from doing that which regularly belongs to us. Indeed, is it not true that, when a man is found complaining of fatigue from overwork, it is almost always not because his load is too heavy to carry, but that his methods of work are wrong? The busiest man is the one who can best dispatch the most business in the least time. The busier the public man, the

more readily and certainly can he push on to any end he has in view. The more readily also can he choose his ends, and reject ends proposed in selfishness or ignorance by others. He can penetrate shams at a glance. This is, in great part, the gift of nature, but education helps anyone to discern realities through pretences.

Measures are often brought forward which profess one purpose to achieve another. Educated men ought to set their faces against lies in the shape of laws. "Law is a sacred thing. Human law should be as near to the laws of physical nature, that is, of God, in simplicity, directness, certainty, and singleness, as things of human make can be to things divine. One of our well-known religious newspapers said, in 1911, of the Federal corporation tax, in commenting on the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States affirming its validity, "The law was frankly passed as a means of securing publicity and control rather than as an income bringer. It was intended to smooth the way to further legislation of supervision." These statements are probably true; but their truth reflects on the standards of American morals. It is ethically indefensible to pass a law for one purpose, which professes quite another. It is using the highest power of sovereignty

to serve false pretences. It lowers the position of the sovereign power before the people. It tends to foster evasion of the laws and distrust of the lawgiver.

Has office, with all its burdens of such responsibilities, any true attractions for the educated man? To none has it more. Human happiness is to be busy over things serving a good end, that one likes to do, and can do well. To be able to render a public service in such a way is a high power, and carries a high pleasure. Education cannot alone create such competence, but it can always be of help in attaining it.

It also aids one who may be in doubt whether to accept or decline a political nomination. It shows him the reasons on both sides. It makes clearer what there is in it to attract, and what there is in it to repel. It teaches that, in these respects, there is little change from one century to another.

Public office is, in one respect, as rewardful, and in another, as unrewardful to an educated American, as it ever has been, or as it ever will be. Alexander Hamilton wrote of it, near the close of the eighteenth century,¹ that its acceptance was a pecuniary sacri-

¹ Letter of May 2, 1797, Works, J. C. Hamilton's Ed., VI, 244.

fice to a successful man in professional life, which he could not long be warranted in making, because the opportunity of doing good was too small, on account of "the jealousy of power and the spirit of faction." Power is no more the object of jealousy, and there is no stronger spirit of faction, now than then. Indeed one can hardly doubt that there is less. Washington was vilified in his day as coarsely as any of his successors have been. Party antagonism, in New England at least, when Jefferson succeeded Adams, was far more bitter than it has been at any time during the last generation.

The progress of world culture, the spread of altruism, the broadening of political perspective consequent on modern facilities for international intercourse, all make for less asperity in political contests, as they make also for wider opportunities for public usefulness in official station. The whole earth is our lesson-book in politics, and he does the most who reads it best. The power of reading it with understanding, it is certain that intellectual training helps to give. This is the constant assurance that sustains the educated man under the responsibilities of official station, and should make him, were there no other reason, ready to assume them if occasion offers.

The heavier those responsibilities, the greater is, or should be, the attraction to assume them, for they will give more surely opportunities for public service. To the educated man, then, who has the public good at heart, there is something to a high degree inviting in a position of large political power. Such a place is not to be gained at a bound. It seldom can be, and never should be. Service in low station naturally comes before service in high station, and is the best preparation for it.

The natural road to official usefulness and official distinction is to accept, or to seek, first, positions of service on party committees, or in the administration of local government, bringing no compensation, except experience and the sense of duty done. The faithful and intelligent school visitor, or juror, or town committee man, will not be overlooked by the men in his party, when they wish to nominate a strong candidate for some higher place. He will also get into that practical touch with men and affairs which is vitally necessary to supplement a college education.

Other opportunities for mingling intimately with the people are necessarily incidental to holding any conspicuous public station. Whoever is in such a place, if he have in any degree at all the faculty of

public speech, and few educated men are wholly without it, is subject to constant calls to appear on the platform, or take part in celebrations and festivities, of any and every kind. They furnish part of his opportunity for public service. The glamor of office excites interest in what he says and doubles its effect on the community.

If he be a man of education, this makes him a man of better education. Naturally he will speak mainly of public affairs, and having to speak on them from a position which assumes more knowledge of their character and bearings than most men have, he is put on serious inquiry. What he says may go far on the wings of the newspapers, and he must feel that it is spoken under circumstances that carry no light responsibility.

The author of any production in the nature of a book or a speech, which involves previous investigations of fact or considerations of scientific principles, works to little purpose unless, while working, he has learned more than he has been able to tell. Whoever interests himself in political affairs, and gains a position of influence in the government of his State or country, whether it be influence in his party or in the actual administration of public functions, is certain soon to feel that he has entered a field where

he is learning more than he can ever impart, and more of good.

No man of letters can long occupy any conspicuous public station, without finding that he has acquired a clearer vision of political theories. He has been enabled to test them in real transactions. He learns to discern better their vital principles, and so their probable consequences. He naturally inclines to study how measures of administration here compare with those of foreign countries, and he can hardly fail to find such study helpful and suggestive.

If he have any taste for authorship in literature, he may find in these ways a substantial opportunity to better the plan of government in which he has a share. A bill for a new statute may grow into a book. When Turgot was the Intendant of a province, two Chinese students attracted his attention, who were about to return to their home after a period of study under French instructors. They sought his counsel, and he took the trouble to write them (in 1766) a letter "on the Formation and Distribution of Wealth," which was the foundation of a treatise that soon took its place as one of the great works of the world that discuss the principles of political economy.

Yet here lies a danger, also. The scholar in public life is under some temptation to give time to the study of political institutions, which belongs to the ordinary routine of official service. His main ambition must be to perform the necessary duties of his position well, from day to day. That comes first.

The newspapers tell us that one who has been the President of the United States said, not long ago, that the good of occupying that position was in the chance it gave to do some great thing. It would seem to me that a greater good was to be found in doing well the ordinary things, with which it falls to the holder of that, as of any other office, to deal. Whether a public station be high or low, it has its appropriate work, which must be done, most of it out of sight and little understood by the private citizen, but none the less vital to the public interest.

The educated man in public station, who does justice to his education, will never fail to recognize the equal moral value of every act, whether it seem great or small, that his office may require of him.

V

THE EDUCATED MAN AS A CREATOR OF
PUBLIC OPINION

THERE are two kinds of public opinion. One is self-produced or self-evident. The other is manufactured. The manufactured kind comes largely from newspaper offices. It reflects the mind of the editor or proprietor. It represents the opinion which he wishes to prevail and, as the wish is always father to the thought, is likely to think to be really that of the general public. Editorials, no doubt, are among the causes that affect and create public opinion, but their influence is remote. The newspaper can plow the ground better than it can cultivate it. Like the work of the advance agent of a travelling show, the forces which it commonly sets in motion are soon spent. If they endure, it is because the mind of the people has been really caught and expressed.

The editor who is an educated man is most apt to succeed in such a way. He can see, through the incidents that attend and often obscure strong popular feeling, what is vital and lies deep below

them. But the power of place which belongs to the editor is reserved for men of his particular profession, of whom there are comparatively few. How does education help men in other callings to create sound public opinion and thus contribute to the common good?

It helps them often most when they are unconscious of pursuing such an object. Influences for good or, it may be, for evil in matters respecting civic conduct, and public legislation, and world-politics radiate out from every educated man, whether he will or no. He is known to have a source of power within him. He is listened to, on this account, if he speaks on public matters, and if he keeps silence, he will be asked to speak.

I do not refer particularly to platform speech. Few have the gift of addressing a great audience in such a way as to make any real impression. (But the educated man who possesses that gift is the keeper of a great treasure, which he has no moral right to leave unused.)

This has been the strength of parliamentary government in Great Britain. The House of Lords has always been mainly composed of educated people, — educated according to the standards of their generation. Men of similar training have

generally constituted a majority of the House of Commons and the whole of the ministry. Debate is a more important factor in legislation in England than with us. There, the executive authorities of the nation always control a majority of the governing body. They must keep this control, or pass out of office. Consequently they must have among them those who can state their policies clearly upon the floor, and defend them with vigor.

With us, where the President of the United States is the master instead of the servant of his cabinet officers, and is practicably irremovable, and where Governors are expected to use their veto power, and none have yet been threatened with a recall, the power of the orator counts for less. It counts for less, and the power of the pen for more.

The educated American finds his largest opportunities for leading public opinion in the ordinary intercourse of common life. Let him never forget, for one thing, when he talks politics with a neighbor, that ours is a system of representative government. That he knows to be the invention of the Anglo-Saxon race. He knows also that it was the Anglo-American race that gave it its present form, and has, therefore, a special obligation to preserve

it from degradation or corruption. Parliament grew slowly from a House of Lords into two houses, in one of which the people were represented. It was still largely under the control of its House of Lords when American government began. It was still making few laws, when the American colonies were making many. It is still making few, while the American States are making many. It is virtually becoming one House, — the House of the People. It is thus turning England from a republic into a democracy. The King is the mere chairman of the committee of the whole.

It has been found less easy to democratize republican government in the United States. Our written constitutions stood in the way. Our House of Sovereign States rose up like the central fortress within a medieval city — a castle of Edinburgh, a citadel of republicanism.

The Americans of the eighteenth century planned something more durable than the English Constitution of the seventeenth century, — the Constitution under which their ancestors had been born, and which had proved inadequate to assure their liberties. It is one of the responsibilities of our educated men to keep this fact before the people, and make it a matter of common pride that true

representative government is less our inheritance than our creation. It is not democratic government. We do not found it on the institutions of Greece or Rome or medieval Europe. We do not found it on English institutions. We have made it something new.

Another American invention is the referendum, introduced here in 1660.¹ It first appears in early New England, but under careful guard. It was to apply only to great questions of public order, like the making or amendment of a social compact or constitution, or else to the disposition of propositions for purely local measures by a purely local vote. In each of these classes of cases, those to whom the decision is left directly are presumably conversant with the main reasons for and against the adoption of the measure. But, when made to serve the purposes of ordinary legislation, the referendum may easily be misapplied. The pressure of recent years for such extensions of it, supplemented by the initiative and the recall, makes for what in principle is un-American. It looks towards an absolute democracy. The referendum invokes the direct action of the people, instead of that of their chosen representatives. It withholds when applied to

¹ Colonial Records of Conn., I, 346, 347.

matters of ordinary legislation, from those holding ultimate political power all opportunity of taking counsel together and exchanging views in a face to face discussion. It destroys, or at least minimizes, the sense of personal responsibility for measures of government.

Do the people generally understand all that these things imply? We know that they do not, and it is the business of the educated man, so far as he can, to guide them to such an understanding. It is his solemn duty to share with them the fruits of knowledge. The educated man must take an interest in politics. All men should, but of all, he most, because he can understand them best. He can best picture to himself and to his fellows the probable consequences of bad laws and bad selections for office. His imagination is, or ought to be, the watchman of the State. He can see farther than others. He can interpret appearances and forecast the future as they cannot. He has, therefore, an opportunity to do much in giving shape to sound public opinion, and it is one which it is his duty actively to improve, if a citizen of a country where, as here, public opinion is a great political force. A Russian might be pardoned for silence. There must be a public — a people — with political authority,

before there can be a public opinion that has any real power.¹

The educated woman has here a place of special opportunity. Much of what has been previously said, in discussing the general subject under consideration, applies equally to her. But in the creation of public opinion women have more power than men. They have the training of the next generation at the stage when it is most impressible. The principles which are then instilled soon seem innate.

Women, also, in the main, create, and by their innate conservatism preserve, the customs of the civilized world. These are largely made by each generation for the next.

In all organized society there are two forces, constantly acting against the individual: that of the whole social organization — the State, — and that of all the other individuals, whom it embraces. The greater the compulsion exercised by them, the less is the compulsion which it can be necessary for the State to exercise. The body of law varies inversely as the body of custom. Even if those rules not prescribed by law are unwise, it would be more unwise for the State to undertake to alter them before the

¹ See Andrew D. White's criticism of Seeley's *Life of Stein, Seven Great Statesmen*, 301, no

mass of the people were ready to consent to such a change.

Human progress is through changes in general customs. What we have learned voluntarily to relinquish, or have become satisfied that it would be better to relinquish, we easily suffer the State to forbid. Public opinion thus precedes law and limits law.

Never has this been shown and seen more clearly than in the twentieth century. It is a caricature of modern society to say that we are making it the age of the crowd and the demagogue. It is, indeed, not as reflective as the eighteenth or as most of the nineteenth. It is too busy in action; too successful in external results; too apt to take things as they come, without stopping to consider how we can personally respond to them. The crowded city is, however, on the whole, proving itself the seat of the best thought. The demagogue is suffered only because he is not exposed. He escapes because the proper guides of the people shirk their duty.

A truer interpretation of this age for Americans is that of Professor Royce, who found in it one "in which our nation, rapidly transformed by the occupation of new territory, by economic growth, by immigration and by education, has been attempt-

ing to find itself anew, to redefine its ideals, to retain its moral integrity, and yet to become a world power." Such times are the transcendent opportunity of every person of superior education, and corresponding character.

In the development of social usages and conventions, the principle of natural selection ultimately governs. Those best adapted to the place and time survive. But the result of this test is seen too late to benefit those who were originally called on to give them their assent, or to refuse it. The educated man, with the aid of history and sociology, can often anticipate the event. By predicting it, and by his ability to show how it is to be predicted, he may thus, within the circle of his influence, render a great service to the men of his generation. He may, and he should. His power is the measure of his duty.

His obligation is not lessened because the majority in the community may be against him. The majority are always led by a minority. An aristocracy of leadership is everywhere inevitable. The place of every educated man is among the leaders, not the followers.

Out of every four hundred children who receive the ordinary training of a public school, only one, on the average, the statisticians say, proceeds to

college and finishes his college course. He has betrayed the opportunity of his youth, if he has not gained something in knowledge and power, which the three hundred and ninety-nine have missed. He, of all others, must do his own thinking, because he has been best taught to think.

Those who come under his influence may not always follow his reasoning, but this will not necessarily impede the acceptance of his conclusions. Many a teacher puts his thoughts so clearly and distinctly in order, that his class think they understand his line of exposition, even if they do not. They have imbibed all that they were capable of assimilating, and probably do well to take the rest on faith. It will be so with the people as a whole. He who would lead them to new opinions must do his best to make plain to them what is plain to him, and then not be too impatient if he find himself misunderstood and misrepresented.

He must be content to move slowly, and not contend for too much, to start with. So far as he can assent to the current doctrines of the day he should let his assent be known. He has, of course, no right to affirm what he believes to be untrue, however widely it may be regarded in the community as incontestable. Sarpi may have been right when he

declared: *La falsità non dico mai mai, ma la verità non a ognuno.* We do not persuade men to follow us by telling them that they are fools, although such they be, and we know it. But we can attack a particular error in their political creed, leading to some present and pressing mischief, without feeling bound to tell them that it is only one of many to which they are equally committed.

The mass of the people will not abandon, as a whole, the general political beliefs current in their time. They will not listen to the voice that pronounces them all unsound. They may be convinced that some of them are unsound, by one who confines himself to attacking those, and those only.

Every man is strongly and incessantly drawn, by the influences of our day, towards the common standards of opinion and action. As he is drawn thitherwards, he is carried away from himself. For most men this is probably well. Each century in modern times has been better than its predecessors, and to stand as well as the average of men in your community in the twentieth century is, comparatively considered, to have attained some measure of success. But what is right for most men is wrong for the educated man. He must keep ahead

of those who have been entrusted with less. Conformity with the mass of the community may do for them. He must labor to make the mass of the community conform to him.

He will do this most effectually, who, so far as may be, speaks from an optimistic standpoint and encourages an optimistic spirit in those around him; seeking to promote public confidence in the soundness of our institutions, and no less to allay public distrust of honest efforts to improve them. The man who has really profited by a college education will not have failed to learn that, in actual life, extreme views are seldom pushed to their logical outcome. He will be apt to hold his own, if he has any, in reserve, and to have little dread of the practical results of those of others. As he looks ahead, he will see no lions in his way.

One of his duties will be to protest against all exaggeration of national perils. Once in every four years an occasion for such exaggeration occurs. An expiring administration is to be judged by the people. There will be platform orators who can see only evil in what it has accomplished, and others who, with equal sincerity or lack of sincerity, can see no evil in what it has accomplished. The party newspapers and the party speakers become oriental

in their style of expression. They deal only in superlatives.

That moderation which flows from education, and runs a steady course, is here of the greatest use. The mass of the people are always distrustful of extremists. They need spokesmen to make this distrust known. The educated American may be, and ought to be, such a spokesman. He must always remember that, in addressing the general public, he is preaching to an audience with a keen instinct of right, but little power of drawing close distinctions, — with feelings easily moved, and, when quickly excited, not always easy to control within reasonable bounds.

Lecky declares that emotion is taking a diminished place in modern life. If this be so, it is the duty of the educated man to do what he can to arrest the movement, were it only for its bearing on practical politics. Public sentiment is a purer source of action, or a source of purer action, than knowledge or even wisdom. It is God-made. Happy the man or woman who can guide it in right paths, be it in small things or in great.

One of the special dangers of our times is that great riches may come to be deemed a measure

of success in life. The millionaire is commoner in the United States than in any other quarter of the globe. It is easier to become one, here than elsewhere. The newspapers are full of their doings. How shall public opinion regard them? How can it be led to see that happiness lies in quite a different direction? No one can preach with so much effect as the educated man the good of living content with a moderate income. He knows, as no other can, how little the possession of the greatest enjoyments of life, moral, intellectual, or physical, depend on wealth. They are for every man who has health, industry, temperance, and thrift. The struggle to accumulate a great fortune belongs to an age with no ideals beyond barbaric splendor, or one, like ours, where it is the excitement of the struggle that is its real reward.

The man whose main capital is his education can insist on these things with effect, for he carries, or ought to carry, the proof in himself.

For one thing, be he rich or poor, it has made him a citizen of the world.

The educated American stands at the center of three circles of social duty. The State throws her circle about him. He owes her allegiance. He owes to her people, in most respects, his first duty. The

next circle, of the United States, is again a field of allegiance, and of broader, though remoter, opportunity for benefit and benefiting. Widest of all comes the circle of the world. Here allegiance, in its strictest sense, is absent; but the obligations of a common humanity are strengthening with every century, and never faster than now.

There has come to be a certain feeling of brotherhood between nations, or at least the beginning of it.

No insignificant event in world-history is the recent establishment at the Hague of a "Foundation for the Promotion of Internationalism." It is at present addressing itself only to the study of the subject with reference to a few particular sciences, but its scope is universal. Already it has taken an active share in establishing there, with the aid of the government of the Netherlands, three permanent bureaux of international co-operation; one that of the International Congress of Medicine; another that of the International Federation of Pharmacy; and the third that of the International Institute of Statistics.

That a State exists for the good of its people is, under the clear light of our day, seen to be true only

when a broad view is taken of what is their good. Each citizen of that State is also a member of human society. Nothing is for his good which brings evil to all other men, except those of his own country. All these other men, as soon as they felt such an evil and knew its source, would unite to put an end to it; and they would succeed by force of numbers.

The French Revolution brought in the watchword of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity; but it was a watchword to signify the true relations of fellow citizens under the same government. Of late, it has been more and more clearly seen, as we set our faces towards the Future, that nations, in their relations with other nations, are coming to own the possibility of making some such cry the voice of the world. It is no longer the poets only who predict the time when

"Nation with nation, land with land,
Unarmed shall live, as comrades free."

The spread of commerce, ocean telegraphy, the aeroplane, the multiplication of international conferences and bureaus of a private as well as of a public nature, the growing use in the Orient of Western languages and customs, the common basis

of university teaching, due to the interchange of instructors between different countries, and the increasing number at all the great universities of students coming from foreign lands, all tend to unify the ideas and standards of the world, and so to remove the causes of war. It has always come largely from differences of national ideas and standards. Cousin puts this strongly in his history of philosophy. In each epoch, he says, some one world power has dominated the rest, and it has done so because it represented the national idea most in accord with the general spirit of the epoch. Whenever it no longer represented it best, its leadership ceased; and it ceased also when this national idea gave place to another, which in turn best reflected the time-spirit, and which some other nation best interpreted and made its own. But it did not surrender its hegemony without a struggle; and that struggle was war.

This had much truth in it, when it was written. But, happily for us, history since the first half of the nineteenth century has taken on a new shape. The professed ideals of all civilized nations are—in the higher ranges of thought and action—almost identical. Italy thought it necessary on seizing Tripoli, to justify her action in a despatch

from her foreign office to a New York newspaper. The world would not have been surprised a thousand years ago, or two hundred years ago, by such an act on the part of a Christian power against a Mahometan power. This is because of a change of view-point. World morals have improved. Education in civil and religious liberty has improved them, and improved them in the same directions.

It is in the power of every educated man to do something to push on this movement towards world unity. He is a citizen of the republic of letters. As such, he can, for one thing, exert a powerful influence by joining, from time to time, in the unofficial international conferences, so many of which are now held every year, to discuss matters of scientific, literary, religious, or economic concern.¹ The topics considered are only those in respect to which there is a possibility of agreement and a certainty of exchanging valuable information. An opportunity is offered by each for forming personal friendships with thinking men of many lands.

Such gatherings of those interested in legal or political science lead also to the study of foreign

¹ See article on *The International Congresses and Conferences of the last Century as Forces Working toward the Solidarity of the World*, in the *American Journal of International Law* for July, 1907.

systems of government and the foundations of citizenship, with an open mind. Are we sure, for instance, that some other nations may not have comprehended, better than we, the character of law? The American, with his inherited love for government by laws and not by men, finds it difficult to accept the general European view that the opinion of a great jurist on a doubtful point is of more weight than the judgment of the highest court; and that the authority of a statute does not really rest on the assent of the people, formally given, by their proper representatives, so much as on its intrinsic reasonableness.

The international conference, official or unofficial, is the creation of the last hundred years. It is an institution which has steadily grown in significance, and to Americans particularly since the close of our Civil War.

Buckle long ago remarked that better systems of internal communication bring in new ideas. Still more is this true of the better systems of international communication, which are the product of the last half century. They open new fields of influence to the common labors of the educated men of all lands, who, as they take daily part in what we may term international life, are in the

very thought of it led always higher. An international life which has its correspondence with the whole world — the whole universe so far as we know it — must draw from the universal, the eternal, the divine, if it would frame rules of conduct that are adequate to its environment.

The thoughtful discipline of years has taught the educated man that there is nothing local or geographical in truth, and that lines between nations mean little to one who has faith in what the nineteenth century was the first to assert as the ruling principle of life — the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God. Such an one occupies a position of detachment from his times. He belongs to them. He feels their influence. He is powerless to escape it. But he belongs to something greater. He is a citizen of that world which has been evolved in slow course of countless ages, and understands, as can no one else, how the present hangs upon the past.

World-opinion is a composite of the opinions of many peoples. The highest point of human achievement is to lead it, provided it be led towards the Right. How best to do this, and what the task really means, the higher education ought to teach.

Public opinion, national or international, has

its laws. It responds to enlightenment. It sometimes deserves censure, and when it does, no one can be so able to pronounce a judgment that, whether followed or not, will be respected, as the educated man.

College prepares him for such a service. In its little world of social ambitions, of warm rivalries, of settled usages, of detachment from outside interests, the student, whatever else he may have received or failed to receive, has been trained under the domination of public opinion, and taught to respect it. He has been one of a society which acknowledged its rightful rule. It has been in some respects, probably, ill founded, narrow, antiquated. If so, let us hope that he has had the manliness to insist on its limitations. The student who has ventured to question a college tradition has undertaken a task beside which that of combating, in maturer days, the traditions of a party or a people often seems light.

Through what channels of approach can the public mind be best made to respond to the influences of the higher learning? Whether it be as to what concerns local, or national, or international affairs, the surest, though not the fastest means of influencing public opinion is monopolized by the

educated. It is that incident to the work of instructing students at school and college. No true teacher will fail to seize that opportunity.

There is another open to all, but much less used, in quite the opposite direction. A class, almost neglected in this respect, but which it is of high importance to reach, in seeking to diffuse sound political ideas, is that of the old men. They have most of the property. It is the stronghold of their position in life. It gives them power in their family, and power in the community. The weight of taxes on capital falls directly on them, and though they throw off most of it on others, they do so for the most part unconsciously. Their natural tendencies are all towards avoidance of new public expenditures and general adherence to old ways and old institutions.

One of Joubert's most striking "*Pensées*" is that "*En élevant un enfant, il faut songer à sa vieillesse.*" The professional educator may well remember this, but others should also. There is no educated man who is not himself an educator, everywhere and always. He too should not forget his duty to the old, and his opportunity, by addressing them in the right way, to bring their great influence to bear on public questions in the direction where

he believes such influence is needed for the general good. They have the leisure to hear him. 'r

Bartsch, in one of his plays, pictures a little city in a sunny valley, where there are many old men who are enjoying their last days in a state of rest, "und Zeit, Zeit haben." He makes them give their time to the life of illusion and ideals, offered by art. But it ought not to be too difficult, by the right arguments, to convince such an one that in honor and duty he is bound to give his strength, so far as it remains, to the true and the actual.⁷ When the struggle for bread is over, and bread assured, there are many, and there should be more, to whom the duty of altruistic life comes home, with the opportunity to adopt it.

This duty of the educated man to appeal to the old grows stronger with every year of his active life, because each brings him nearer to the age of those whose ear he hopes to get. He becomes closest to them when he is, at last, one of them, and then is his opportunity for such service greatest. The old man who stands for old methods will always find a ready audience in his own class. He will be listened to and put forward by a larger class, if he stands for new methods. He ought not to lose his interest in public questions, because they cannot

concern him long. If education has given him power, it is precisely because his years are few that he is bound to use it, as he may have opportunity, for the public benefit. A long life has certainly brought him variety of knowledge. Its fitting close is to use it for others' good. The old man who is ready and able to do this is only fulfilling a natural obligation, and as he does it, he can say with Jowett that "the last ten years of life are the best, for they are the freest from care, the freest from illusions, and the fullest of experience."

The duty of the university graduate to do his part in shaping public opinion as to the conduct of public affairs is more important now than in former ages, because the influence of education on the disposition of political questions is more personal, less corporate, than once.

The conception of its worth and authority in such matters, which led to the representation of the two great English universities in Parliament, and of William and Mary College in the Virginia House of Burgesses, has given way to theories of a more purely popular representation. The authority to speak for a university is now limited to expressions concerning university problems alone. Time was

when universities were not seldom officially consulted by governments as to the nature of rules affecting matters of State, and a response given which was *ex cathedra*, but the eighteenth century witnessed the abandonment of this practice forever.¹

The university man in the United States owes it to his country to do whatever is in his power to cultivate a public opinion carrying popular trust in our judicial institutions. Here one distinction between our government and all others cannot be too often explained or too strongly insisted on.

With us, our courts virtually, though indirectly, are part of and control our political machinery; though for the most part only in settling controversies between private individuals. Justice, in American government, means legal justice. It does not mean social justice, unless it be also legal. Here our written Constitutions set the United States apart from all other nations. If Germany wishes to compel employers to compensate their workmen

¹When, in championing the Catholic Disabilities Repeal Act, in 1791, William Pitt desired information as to whether a Roman Catholic's allegiance to the Pope came before his allegiance to his country, and sought it in leading universities of Spain and France, it was by application to particular members of their faculties for their individual opinion.

for any injury suffered in the course of the employment, it finds no obstacle to its doing so by a new statute. But such legislation here must be judged by certain constitutional standards, and it is for the courts ultimately to apply the test. The educated man must impress on the common people at large this fact, and that if they find it one inconvenient to reckon with, their efforts should be not so much to devise new statutes as to change their Constitutions.

It has been found next to impossible to amend the Constitution of the United States, unless in some time of profound national upheaval. With the State Constitutions it is, and it should be, otherwise. Each of them concerns a comparatively small body of people, living in close intercourse with each other, and having in the main common interests and traditions.

The man of education should look to it that the people of his State appreciate the fact that, as to by far the greater part of the law that governs their mutual relations, it is always in their power to change it in a year or two, either by legislation or constitutional amendment. They can make and remake their own government. The power of every official is what they choose to give him. If it be too great,

the fault is theirs. If it be too small, the fault also is theirs.

Public opinion should be led to support the placing of large authority in the executive department of government. Every year that passes shows more clearly how all-important this is, for the maintenance of social order. It is demanded, if by nothing else, by the increased and increasing intelligence of the people. Ages of popular education are likely to be ages of increased political activity. The State will be pressed to take more upon itself. It will thus antagonize those whom it displaces. The antagonisms may be sharp. If so, there will be a greater call for force to support the new social order. Force may sometimes be met by force; — the collective force of all by the collective force of a part. What public sentiment before regulated or repressed must now be overcome by sterner methods. They must be used with a wisdom and an effectiveness proportioned to the intelligence of those against whom they are directed.

John C. Calhoun said that the time of trial for our country would come when all the people were fully educated. It had been proved to be possible to govern the ignorant, by means of a republic. It would be a new problem of free government,

when it came to deal with those who all knew as much as those who bore rule over them.

There are those who claim that under such conditions Gresham's law is as valid in education as in finance. As Dr. Flexner has put it, in a recent publication of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, in a community overstocked with physicians, the inferior medium tends to displace the superior.

To me the reverse seems true. A people may, as a whole, be over-educated, but the best educated of them will be those to whom the most will turn for help in matters of real importance, and from whom public opinion is most likely to take its color.

The best educated will often do the highest service in advocating halfway measures. They are seldom popular, but they are often the wisest.

The ordinary man has a poor sense of proportion. He is too apt to be an extremist, without knowing it. He must be shown, among other things, how much is lost by going too far and doing overmuch in this line or in that.

He must be made to feel also that party platforms have their limitations, and that every plank in them may not be equally sound and substantial. The natural tendency, under a system of representa-

tive government, is to put too much faith in political parties. Few thinking men can approve every measure to which their party may commit itself. But the place of the educated man, nevertheless, is, I believe, generally to be found in the party with which he finds himself most nearly in agreement. He gets a backing there which makes his influence, on the whole, count for far more.

The last half century, in political matters, has steadily marched away from Individualism. Probably the march has not been wholly for good. The feeling of individual responsibility has been weakened. Individual initiative has been repressed. Individual freedom has been limited at more and more points. A narrowing of the circle of individual rights in all directions is evident. Suffrage itself has been fettered and circumscribed by the introduction of direct primaries and complicated ballots.

But whether we think these movements well-judged or not, and whether the collectivism of party is or is not to be preferred to the individualism of the independent voter, it is hardly to be doubted that there is another field in which individualism is an obstacle to progress. It is the field of associated

effort by private citizens for promoting public ends unconnected with party questions.

Much more can be accomplished, in influencing public opinion in a particular direction, by a society of individuals, acting collectively, than by all its members, acting each for himself. If the initiative be left to each, there will be no common plan to pursue,—no common points towards which to struggle. The great end in view may be settled and recognized by all. But as to the lines to choose, best leading up to it, there will be no harmony of design.

We must recognize, then, a duty of the educated man to promote associated effort of this kind for good ends. Here as everywhere, however, he must act with moderation, and advise with care. We all know how many organized and officered associations there are or have been, professedly aiming to stir public opinion and promote the public interests in one way and another, but, in fact, absolutely superfluous. What is their general history? Almost always it is this. A few ardent and hopeful spirits promoted the original formation of the society. They prepared its constitution and by-laws,—usually far too lengthy. They got up the first meeting, keeping themselves in the background,

and putting forward some figure heads of greater distinction. A few years pass and the society has vanished, not because its ends were not good, but because its members threw what was their burden on its officers, and they in turn passed it over to hired agents, or perhaps because some other association was found to have been already doing the same work sufficiently well. Or if it survives, it has sunk into a receptacle for annual contributions, which get no farther than the pocket of a paid secretary, who magnifies his office but not its fruits.

Many a society for the promotion of philanthropic causes and altruistic public sentiment, lives on what it gets from educated men who are too indolent to inquire how the annual dues are spent. Often, if they would take the trouble to investigate, they would find that it had long outlived its usefulness, and was engaged in the hopeless effort to manufacture public sentiment by proxy. Every such scheme of public service, as Emerson has said, naturally tends to become a job.

The power of those of superior intellectual training to shape public opinion has not grown in proportion to the general advancement of human knowledge. This general advancement has been so rapid and

extensive that few can hope to keep pace with it. The rest are content to concentrate and localize their studies.

The man whom the twentieth century counts as a scholar is therefore, in some respects, less fitted to lead the opinion of the community than were educated men in previous ages. His education has covered less ground. If he be not what we term a specialist, he has some of the limitations of one. The spirit of our times, in university circles at least, looks on high scholarship in a particular field, as entitled to more respect than high attainments in general knowledge. But the world at large does not look for leaders in world government from great scholars in any particular science. It wants "all-round" men, more. They can do it more good, because they know more of things in general, even if in any particular subject they may be comparatively deficient. Their sympathies are wider. The man with but one idea is never popular. Few care to hear him talk twice. Queen Victoria said of Lord John Russell, that he would be better company, if he had a third subject, but he was interested in nothing but the Constitution of 1688 and himself.¹

The public man who is, at heart, devoted to

¹ Proceedings of the Mass. Hist. Soc., XVIII, 147.

nothing but personal ambitions or gains is soon detected. The public are not interested in advancing his fortunes or listening to his counsels. Education may help him for a time, but not for long, in influencing public opinion in directions especially benefiting himself, or to advance the particular interests of some class in the community to which he may belong, or which he desires to favor.

To use his powers thus, for promoting the good of one man or one class at the cost of the rest of the people, whatever be the motive, is, of course, to violate his obligations to his country. Nor can what he may accomplish endure. A public opinion rooted in selfishness or class interest may, at times, be held by a majority of the voters, or of those of them who care to vote. But a small majority differs little from a large minority; nor is a large majority of all the voters even where woman's suffrage prevails, ever a majority of the people. The children will outnumber their parents. The children are those upon whom the burden of class privilege or any other form of bad legislation will be apt to fall most heavily. It prepares the conditions under which they are to enter on active life. It determines, so far forth, whether they are to have, as between

themselves, an equal chance. Any wrong to them they will right in due season.

Nor, although the public opinion, for the time being, of the voters run in an overwhelming current, will it endure, even for the life of the generation which holds it, if it be fundamentally unjust. Against such a current, the educated man must stand in his place, to the utmost of his power, sustained by the steady faith, which his education should assure, in the correcting influence of time.

VI

THE SPIRIT OF CHRISTIAN CITIZENSHIP

THE terms of any foundation established in perpetuity for educational ends, must be interpreted, in every age, with some regard to the spirit of that age. What is the Christian citizenship, which the founder of this lecture course may thus be taken to have had in mind, in planning for an annual reiteration of the duties that are attached to it?

The twentieth century has accepted, without reservation, some points of philosophy which were treated as doubtful in the nineteenth. The doctrine of evolution has thus come to occupy an assured place in the thought of the world, and time once given to attacking or defending it is now devoted to studying its incidents and corollaries. We can see that Christianity is a work of evolution, and has meant very different things in different centuries. It is viewed as less distinctive in form than it was once thought to be. Greater emphasis is placed on its influence on the affairs of earth, as compared with what may be its influence on human destiny in a future state of existence. Less store is set

on its theological formulas and more on its ethical and moral inspirations. A closer study of comparative religion has shown that more of these elevating forces than was once supposed are common to other faiths; and we no longer shut our eyes to the truth that men professing no religion are often, so far as man can judge, among the leaders in whatever makes for civic good.

Christian citizenship is a comprehensive term. Those who most fully take upon themselves its duties are by no means the same as those who believe that Christianity is the best form of religious faith. The substance beneath that form has never been more clearly explained than by Jesus Christ himself, as he closed the Sermon on the Mount: "Not every one that saith unto me, 'Lord, Lord,' shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my father, which is in heaven." Many a one before the birth of Christ, and many a one since, to whom Christian doctrine in forms of creed and metaphysics has been unknown and, if known, would have been repulsive, has done the will of his Father in Heaven, as he understood it, and found, in doing it, the key to the kingdom of heaven. However we regard such a man's attitude towards Christianity, there is something larger than

Christianity. The Christian religion is one of many forms of what we call religion. We may consider it the greatest; but religion is larger than any of its parts. The world also is larger than religion, and larger than the church, whether that be viewed as one, or as an aggregation of many churches.

In our land, with its composite people, and its perfect toleration of all religions, the influence of the educated man should be steadily exerted to promote respect for all of them, — for all, at least, that deserve the name.

There has never been a country, of any degree of civilization, in which religion has not been a strong safeguard of government. Its general effect has been to teach obedience to authority; to repress selfishness; to be a terror to evil doers. It has always helped to content men with life. It has held before them the thought of a life after death, and of an invisible power that ruled their destinies, whether in this world or the next. Loss of religious belief, on the part of any people, brings with it loss of morality, and dulls the sense of civic duty. Carlyle struck to the heart of the matter when he said that a man was living in a state of rebellion, if he rendered no worship, and had no reverence for anybody.

The respect of an educated man for religion will be quite distinct from what may be his view of any particular form of religious profession. He may be a strong Methodist or a strong Roman Catholic; but he will feel that his own church, whatever it be, gives at best but an inadequate expression of what Man owes to God, of what God has done for Man. He may affiliate himself with no church. He may be an agnostic, or an atheist, but he will none the less feel and inculcate respect for what so many others revere. He will recognize the importance of religious institutions as the greatest single police force of civil government, — with us an unpaid force, so far as public moneys are concerned. If he be a believer in Christianity, he will do his part, as he has opportunity, to set forth its real nature and spirit. Unless these underlie the general religious thought of Christian people, there will be easy entrance for atheism, and atheism logically leads to anarchy.

Cardinal Newman said that two distinct types of mind were shown in the Catholic and the Puritan. To the Catholic the visible and the invisible were only two different aspects of one great reality. To the Puritan they stood apart, as sundered, if not antagonistic.

What this great thinker and greater writer thus described as the Catholic view, is in fact becoming in this century the universal type of the philosophy of religion. It is not so much by the multiplication of believers in the Roman Catholic church, as by the passing of Protestant theology from the control of Puritan ideas. The oneness of life, here and hereafter, is the prevailing, if half unuttered, faith of the whole of American Christendom.

President Butler of Columbia University has said that a complete education must include science, art, literature, institutional life, and religious beliefs. Of these, all but science and art involve a study of religions, and make a pulpit of every student's desk. They may convince him that no religion is absolutely perfect. They may convince him that he, personally, has no need to ally himself to any of them.

The educated man often feels himself able to stand upright alone, unaided by religion. He sees so many problems on every side calling for consideration and susceptible of at least approximate solution, that there seems no room and no time for concerning himself with what belongs to the supernatural or the infinite. But there are few such as he. He must live, be it only for life as he now under-

stands it, in such a way as to do no injury to the majority of the community. He does such an injury, if he actively deny the existence of a personal God, and a future life. For them, if not for him, a belief in those things is necessary to keep the individual in proper relations to the State. As Napoleon said, if there were no religion, those charged with the administration of government would everywhere have to invent one.

Comparative religion is a subjective study. It centers about man. The world is becoming Christianized, not so much by the slow advances, here and there, of what we term missionary effort, put forth by professed religionists, as by the general advance everywhere of the human towards the humane. The teachings of Christianity quicken the growth of civilization, and set in order the forces on which all good government rests. Their influence in those directions is felt by men of all religions, and more and more is taking possession of the leaders of thought in every nation. We may almost say, as we view the work of the last twenty years in deepening the foundations of international concord, that the world has been Christianized, and has already begun to come under the dominion of the "Prince of Peace."

It is hard to bring home to ourselves the extent to which, within that period, the moral forces of the world have been quickened and expanded. It has made possible much that previously would have been justly regarded by most men as impossible. The universal power of public opinion has consecrated humanity. All governments have been assimilated. All governments have been associated in the endeavor to re-mould the laws of nations, private and public. To the last of the six great Conferences that have been held at the Hague for the advancement of international law, public or private, all civilized nations were parties, and its main endeavor was to set bounds to war.

The men whose education enables them to watch this great world-movement most intelligently owe it to their fellows to explain how it can best be promoted and made most useful to all. They see, and they can make others see how great is the reason for hope that the reign of War has nearly passed, in that the civilized world has at last attained a common stand-point, first, in regard to the nature of civil government, and, second, in regard to the ethics of political administration.

Once before in the history of the world there was such a common stand-point. It was when Chris-

tianity reached the throne of the Roman empire. To the educated man of that day, — necessarily a subject of the empire, and probably adhering to the Christian church, — the community of mankind was a familiar conception.

The Holy Roman empire prolonged the prevalence of the philosophical doctrine of human brotherhood, but denied it in the practice of government. Wars of religion came to belie it. Europe fell apart under the Protestant Reformation. Humanity became a thing of literature rather than of life.

Kant never showed himself more truly a seer than when he said that the world, before it could become one, must become republican in its form of government. That time, in substance, has now arrived. It makes little difference, in effect, what a country calls itself, or calls its rulers. England, with a king and emperor, is, at home, more of a democracy than France. It is more of a democracy than the United States, with our series of successive electorates for President and Senators, with our absolutism in the executive department, and with our transcendent and uncontrollable authority in the judicial department. But in England, in France, in the United States, in every civilized country, the twentieth century sees the good of the people acknowledged

to be the end of government and the will of the people its supreme law. The State, we everywhere agree with Hegel, arose out of society to guarantee to each individual, and to each alike, that he shall remain master of his individuality against the self-seeking efforts of any competitor.

Nowhere has this political conception been expressed in terms of law so fully as in the United States. It is rational and it is religious to maintain that the best form of civil government, whatever it may be or come to be, should be ultimately adopted by every country fitted to receive it. American citizens have thus, if their scheme of government is what most of them believe it to be, a special responsibility and opportunity to labor for the general acceptance, throughout the world, of its essential principles.

Dr. Franklin was the first to suggest that the United States of America might lead the way for the United States of Europe. In a letter from him, written to a European correspondent, in October, 1787, he speaks thus of the new scheme of government, worked out by the Convention of that year at Philadelphia, and then before the country for ratification: "If it succeeds, I do not see why you might not in Europe carry the Project of good

Henry the 4th into Execution, by forming a Federal Union and One Grand Republick of all its different States & Kingdoms; by means of a like Convention; for we had many Interests to reconcile.”¹

A conference of publicists was held at Rome, in 1909, styling itself the first Congress of European Federation. Two resolutions were adopted, which breathe the true civic spirit of our century. One affirmed the desirability of a federation of the States of Europe which, without any attack on the autonomy or limitation of the sovereign rights of each nation, should have for its object to multiply international conventions, in order to regulate the economic and social relations of the different States by a uniform legislation: the other proposed the institution of a Supreme International Court, with cognizance of appeals involving the legal interpretation of international conventions which establish rules of private international law.²

A similar court, to hear appeals in cases of vessels seized as prize of war, is likely soon to become an established institution, under the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1907.

¹ Farrand, *The Records of the Federal Convention*, III, 131.

² 1^{er} Congrès de la Fédération Européenne: *Compte-Rendu Sommaire*, Rome, 1909, p. 36.

The progress made and promised in these directions can only be understood by men of education, or those to whom they tell of it. It appeals with especial force to Americans. It makes for the advance of Christian citizenship. It finds, in the Christian spirit, its most powerful support.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes declared last year, that "Life is a roar of bargain and battle, but in the very heart of it there rises a mystic spiritual note that gives meaning to the whole." There is something of the mystic to everything that is spiritual. The two belong together. The world often seems to move by faith, faster than by reason. The educated man is most powerful, as a leader of public opinion, when he can appeal to each, in its place. He knows better than others that nothing is permanently gained unless the reason is convinced. He knows that if we must choose between faith and reason, then as to all that human reason can apprehend with full assurance, we should be untrue to the God within us, did we not make that reason the final test. As Luther said, "*Was der Vernunft entgegen ist, ist's gewiss dass es Gott viel mehr entgegen ist.*"

Benjamin Kidd, towards the close of the last century, in what is still the most noteworthy attempt

to reconstruct Christian philosophy on the basis of biological evolution, affirmed that a rational religion was a scientific impossibility.¹ Reason, he said, dictated a selfish struggle for existence, on the part of the individual or of any particular body of individuals. To conduct otherwise was scientifically unreasonable. Yet men did often conduct otherwise. They voluntarily subordinated their interests to those of some social organism, of which they were a part. They did so from a sense of duty. The justification of such conduct was ultra-rational, and a sufficient sanction was to be found only in religion.

I shall not stop to ask whether pure ethics might not also claim to offer such a sanction. Religion certainly does, and in no religion are the ethical and the altruistic so closely blended as in Christianity.

But Christianity is stated in very different terms by different people. It may be so described as to offend human reason: it may be so described as to satisfy human reason.

The educated American who would promote the advance of Society by promoting altruism, and so seeks to ally himself with the forces of religion, has not gone very far when he has proclaimed that Christianity deems every sin a form of selfishness.

¹ Social Evolution, 109.

He must uphold the authority of Christianity to maintain this doctrine; and here he must be able to appeal to reason. He is urging Society to act from altruism, not because this can be proved to be philosophically reasonable, but because religion commands it. This religion then — in the prevailing form in which it appears in this country — he has the burden of showing to be reasonably consistent with itself, if its tenets be properly stated. In other words, he can deduce no effective arguments, to carry conviction to thoughtful minds, from the teachings of Christianity, unless those teachings are scientifically examined, and — as he represents them to be — are scientifically vindicated.

If this is not done, nothing is done that will be lasting, towards the improvement of society. David Ritchie pierced to the kernel of the truth when he said that "under the conditions of modern life in civilized countries, in proportion as religions remain uninfluenced by rationalism, they become sources of national weakness and not of strength."¹

It is to be remembered, also, that what is done primarily for one's own country, may have more lasting effects in some other country, to which the torch of truth has been handed on. A whole people

¹ Studies in Political and Social Ethics, 22.

may perish, but under modern conditions of international intercourse, their discoveries and philosophies never can.

Germany, during the last century, rescued the bible from the hands of mistaken friends, who were interpreting it under a theory of verbal inspiration. The German scholars who did this were working, not for Germans only, but for the world. They set currents of thought in motion here, which have re-made the bible for Americans. It has given it new support on the side of reason; new light on the side of history. We feel, as a people, that the educated man best appreciates the bible, and the relative importance of its different parts. So far, then, as those less educated are able to understand his view, they have the right to expect him to use every fair opportunity to explain to them what is so clear to him, that all may comprehend the difference in weight between a ceremonial rule of the Mosaic law, and a precept of moral conduct uttered by Jesus Christ.

In 1911 Paul Neumann, a private in the German army, was condemned to imprisonment for life. Compelled by law to engage in military service, he had served four years but, being a Seventh Day Adventist, he believed that the seventh day was to

be kept sacred, as a day of rest. Refusing, from the first, to do any military duty on Saturday, he had been repeatedly sent to the guard-house for this insubordination, and had, in fact, spent most of his time there. He is described as a strong and intelligent man particularly well read in the bible.

But how must he have read it? The Decalogue to him was the voice of God speaking to him, to-day. For him German scholarship had done nothing. His religion was bottomed on a misconception. One wonders if there were not those in whom he had confidence, who could have helped him to a better understanding of the truth, and if such a life could not even now be saved to the State by a wise word from some one who feels, in their full measure, the responsibilities of Christian citizenship.

Those responsibilities are heavier, no doubt, in regard to morals than to doctrine. They have almost nothing to do with systematic theology, in countries where there is not an established religion. The atheist, even, who acknowledges the brotherhood of man, may be simply differing from the rest of us on a question of names.

But there are few educated men who do not believe in the existence of a God. If others can, they cannot fail to be impressed with the famous argument

of Kant: "*Zwei Dinge erfüllen das Gemüt mit immer neuer und zunehmender Bewunderung und Ehrfurcht, je öfter und anhaltender sich das Nachdenken damit beschäftigt: der bestirnte Himmel über mir und das moralische Gesetz in mir; — denn sie beweisen mir, dass ein Gott über mir und ein Gott in mir ist.*"

Nor are there many educated men who do not feel that, so far as they can judge, such conduct as the highest civilization pronounces to be virtuous, wise, and just, best accords with the order of the universe, which is but another name for the divine will.

This is far from saying that that order harmonizes with the ethics of our time, or that these ethics harmonize with the reason of our time, or with what seem the ruling principles of human nature. It does imply a duty of every citizen, in all times, according to the measure of his ability, to work towards making the laws and institutions of the land, and the whole life of political society, conform to those higher rules of action which, to those of his contemporaries who have the highest knowledge and clearest vision, seem to belong to the realm of the eternal.

The citizen of a republic is engaged in a scientific scheme. So far as he acts in a political capacity,

he must act, so far as he can see the truth, under the rules of the science of politics. It is a noble science; "nobler, even," James Russell Lowell once said, "than astronomy, for it deals with mutual repulsions and attractions, not of inert masses, but of bodies endowed with thought and will, calculates moral forces, and reckons the orbits of God's purposes toward mankind."

It is a science which it is not at our option to study. We must study it, so far as we have the time and power, or we are untrue to the public trust which citizenship in a free government involves. That government we have an opportunity, and therefore an obligation, to endeavor to improve. If the laws are not what they should be, every man by whose representatives they are made or continued, is bound to labor for their repeal. He is not to be content to take the past at its own valuation. Still less can he take the attitude that it makes little difference to a people in what manner they are governed, and that, as it is the easiest way, so it is the best way to let things go as they are.

Soon after the beginning of the last half of the nineteenth century, some one, in speaking of the editorial staff of the London Saturday Review, said that "whereas with the generation of the Reform

Bill everything had been new, everything had been true, and everything had been of the highest importance, with them nothing was new, nothing was true, and nothing was of any importance." If the charge was just, it was a serious fall from the one level to the other, but the English nation certainly did not share in it.

There is always a place for the reformer. There is always a reward for well-motivated and well-directed political activity. The idealists always win in the end. The true, the good, and the beautiful in human society are always ahead of us and the best citizens are those who, as they have pressed towards them, have felt most strongly, to use the words of Rousseau, that "*le bon n' était que le beau mis en action.*"¹

To follow the true, one must know what it is. The good citizen must be satisfied of that, first of all. The uneducated man must often content himself with accepting what others, whom he meets in daily life, may say in regard to it. The educated man can go to the highest sources, and read with full understanding. For him as a citizen the only rule is that of St. Paul: "Prove all things; hold fast that which is good." But so far as he finds himself com-

¹ La Nouvelle Héloïse, Part II, Letter XII.

pelled to accept what others prove, he owes it to himself to follow the highest teachings and the highest teachers of truth.

In the Parisian cemetery of *Père le Chaise*, tomb-stone bears this inscription: "*Ici repos Auguste Charles Collignon, mort plein de confiance dans la bonté de Dieu, à l'âge de 68 ans et 4 mois, le 15 Avril, 1830. Il aimait et cherchait à faire du bien, et menait une vie douce et heureuse en suivant, autant qu'il peut, la morale et les leçons des essais de Montaigne et des Fables de la Fontaine.*" Many a man whose friends do not thus advertise it, has taken his philosophy from moralists of similar types, when he could have found something better in the words of one of whom it was said: "Never man spake like this man." Many an American has done this because the influences of his early education left him a stranger to the teachings of the New Testament. Religious freedom, that is, freedom of religion, brought him, under our notion of the duty of the State, freedom from religion.

The independent and individual study of moral by the American citizen is thus especially necessary because the nature of our institutions makes the public schools mainly silent in regard to it. Mr Bryce has said in his *American Commonwealth*

that of all the differences between the United States and the rest of the world none is so marked as that pertaining to the absence of religious tests or a religious establishment. Unlike the European, we have nowhere, for at least a century, looked at the State as "an ideal moral power charged with the duty of forming the characters and guiding the lives" of its people. Since we do not, its citizens must share this function between them, in each generation, for the benefit of the next. What the State does elsewhere, the home and the church must here assume upon themselves, aided always by the good and true in the entire community, according to the measure of their opportunities.

It is indispensable, under every form of government, that the character of the people should be built up by the aid of the wisest and best. Their political aims must be kept high. It must be made an axiom of civics that no law should ever be enacted, no line of social conduct tolerated, which sinks below the moral standards of the time.

A political revolution seldom accomplishes any good to a people unless it be accompanied by a moral revolution. Only a moral cause, indeed, — if we take "moral" in its broad and truest sense, — can justify a political revolution, and if any success

which is attained is to be permanent, it must be identified with moral advancement.

The standards of right for an individual and for the State may not always be identical, at least in form. As has been already observed, in another connection, Christian citizenship is not inconsistent with national selfishness, for government is administered by trustees for the people. We can give away and give up what belongs to ourselves; not what we hold for others. The authorities of a nation which has some positive advantage over other nations, or some positive interest that is opposed to their interests, may do right when, in behalf of those for whom they act, they cherish and keep what it has got.

But Christian citizenship is always inconsistent with personal selfishness. We are bound in honor and faith, as regards our political action, to use our power to affect the public at large, for the good of the public at large. For the same reasons we must steadfastly oppose others who may use theirs for their own peculiar and undue benefit. The temptation to better one's position, by the aid of legislation, at the expense of others, is a strong one. To do this is, of course, to use the power of the whole community to injure a part of it for the benefit of

another part. The most effectual means of resistance are, first, the influence of religion, supported by the churches, and, second, popular enlightenment, aided forwards by the use of press and platform. If the people can be made to see the essential unfairness of such legislation, it will not be enacted, or, if enacted, will be soon repealed, — repealed at latest by the next generation.

The disposition of large commercial questions has often turned on considerations of this character. The Corn Laws were in no small part carried through parliament by the voice of the English pulpits. In any such times of political discussions, the man of broad education is in a position of great advantage and corresponding obligation. In studying any question of economic policy, he can see both how it affects an individual producer or the individual consumer, and how it bears on the general welfare of society, of which the consumers may constitute but a small part, and the producers a part numerically inconsiderable. If, in casting a vote or administering an office, he acts under a sense of the responsibilities of Christian citizenship, he will not forget that the welfare of society, as a whole, is the only justifiable object and, we may say, the only professed object, to be served by any policy of

trade. If it be one that favors individual freedom, it favors it, ostensibly, at least, because society is to profit by individualism. If it be one that favors collectivism, and so State Socialism, it is with the claim that Socialism, to that extent, is the natural and proper outcome of society.

Citizenship rests on justice. Its powers and privileges are given because it is just to give them. They must, therefore, be exercised in a spirit of justice. Christianity is a religion of sympathy, but it can make no compromise with evil. He who would keep his citizenship Christian may give due force to sentiment, but none to sentimentalism. This is particularly dangerous in its bearing on criminal justice. A crime is an offence against the State, that is, against the whole people. It may involve no violation of moral law. It may be committed unintentionally. It may be bitterly regretted the next moment. It may be followed by the strongest and purest resolutions that such an act shall never be done again. Nevertheless, in the ordinary course of justice it requires punishment by society, and for the sake of society. The magistrate "beareth not the sword in vain."

Against this theory of the duty of the State a

protest has come during the last three quarters of a century from a large school of penologists. They assert that the main end of punishing the criminal is to reform him. Some go farther and assert that it is the only end. In the Constitution of Indiana (adopted in 1851), it is provided that "the penal code shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice." If by "vindictive justice" is meant a justice which is vindicated by the imposition of punishment, this provision seems to me quite opposed to the teachings of the New Testament, and equally opposed to common sense. The individual who is wronged may be enjoined to forgive. But to the State, which represents not only him but the offender, and not only both of these but the rest of its people, the paramount object must be to do what justice demands. The crime must be regarded, as well as the criminal. No life and no property would be secure, in a country where the theory of the Indiana constitution was practically carried out.

There are, however, social penalties for wrongdoing that governments may properly consider, in determining the character of legal punishments. The freer a country is, in respect to the degree of restraint exercised by the public over the conduct

of the individual, the more room is left for society to bind him by its rules and conventions. It is the office of social institutions to be the complement of political institutions. They are the same only in the theories of Plato.

The responsibilities of Christian citizenship extend alike to each, and its influence must be thrown with an equal hand against whatever may be bad in each. But it is an easier task to amend the laws than to amend society. Nothing is so obstinate as ancient custom.

The spirit of Christian citizenship is a spirit of patience. It hopes for more than it expects. He who possesses it must be prepared to talk to dull ears. He will make whole-hearted advances to those whom he believes can profit by his help and find them but half-heartedly received. He will be content to wait and look to the Future to see to it that the work of one generation is completed by the next.

Schiller said that, in the warmth of youth, he stretched out his arms to save the world, and found he had clasped a lump of ice. The young man who cherishes high aims is almost sure to underrate the wisdom of the community, and overestimate his own. He will be apt to mistake education for the

power of education. He will discover in time that, if the world gave him a chill reception, the fault was in part his.

The Christian citizen of the twentieth century will be among the first to own that wherever modern civilization extends, we are generally judged according to our deserts, and "this wise world is mainly right."

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